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Acute episodes of mental illness temporarily destroy the capacity required to
give informed consent and often prevent people from realizing they are sick,
causing them to refuse intervention. Once a person refuses treatment, the only
way to obtain care is as an involuntary patient. Even in the midst of acute
episodes, many people do not meet commitment criteria because they are not
likely to injure themselves or others and are still able to care for their basic needs.
Left untreated, the episode will likely spiral out of control. By the time the person
finally meets strict commitment criteria, devastation has already occurred. This
Article argues that an individual should have the right to enter a Ulysses
arrangement, a special type of mental health advance directive that authorizes a
doctor to administer treatment during a future episode even if the episode causes
the individual to refuse care. The Uniform Law Commissioners enacted the
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act as a model statute to address all types of
advance health care planning, including planning for mental illness. However,
the Act focuses on end-of-life care and fails to address many issues faced by
people with mental illness. For example, the Act does not empower people to
enter Ulysses arrangements and eliminates writing and witnessing requirements
that protect against fraud and coercion. This Article recommends that the
Uniform Law Commissioners adopt a model mental health advance directive
statute that empowers people to enter Ulysses arrangements and provides
safeguards against abuse. Appendix A sets forth model provisions.
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CASE FOR A MODEL MENTAL HEALTH DIRECTIVE STATUTE
It must be remembered that for the person with severe mental illness who has
no treatment the most dreaded of confinements can be the imprisonment inflicted
by his own mind, which shuts reality out and subjects him to the torment of voices
and images beyond our own powers to describe.
INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Law Commissioners ("the Commissioners") created the
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act ("the Uniform Act") as a comprehensive
model advance directive statute for states to adopt.2 The Uniform Act purports to
address all types of advance health care planning, including planning for mental
illness.3 However, the Commissioners focused on end-of-life decision-making,
not mental illness. Therefore, the Uniform Act fails people with mental illness in
several ways. Half of the states, recognizing that planning for end-of-life care
implicates different issues than planning for mental health treatment, enacted
separate mental health directive statutes. However, these statutes also fail to
empower patients.
A key failure of the Uniform Act, which will be further discussed in Part II,
4
is that it does not empower patients to form self-binding arrangements for care.
Instead, the Uniform Act states that an individual may revoke her directive at any
time. It does not expressly require capacity for revocation or allow patients to
designate whether they may revoke their directives when they lack capacity.
Arguably, it prevents patients from forming irrevocable directives and therefore
provides no guidance on administering treatment pursuant to an irrevocable
directive. For these reasons, the Uniform Act deprives patients of a valuable tool,
the Ulysses arrangement.
A Ulysses arrangement is a type of mental health advance directive (mental
health directive) that serves as a preventative measure for a patient to obtain
treatment during an episode because the patient has learned that episodes cause
I Olmsted v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 609-10 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
2 Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act,
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION (Jan. 12, 1994), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/
health%20care%20decisions/uhcdafinal_93.pdf [hereinafter UHCDA] (The Act superseded the
Commissioners' Model Health-Care Consent Act (1982), the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act (1985), and the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (1989).). See generally Charles P.
Sabatino, The New Uniform Health Care Decisions Act: Paving a Health Care Decisions
Superhighway?, 53 MD. L. REV. 1238 (1994); Marah Stith, The Semblance ofAutonomy: Treatment
of Persons with Disabilities Under the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, 22 ISSUES L. & MED.
39 (2006).
3 UHCDA § 1 cmt. (stating the health care definition is to be given the broadest construction);
see also Maurice S. Fisher, Psychiatric Advance Directives and the Right to Be Presumed
Competent, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 386, 397 (2009) (asserting that UHCDA affords
patients the ability to make decisions concerning future mental health issues); Sabatino, supra note
2, at 1240.
4 UHCDA § 3.
5 UHCDA § 3(a)-(b).
3
3
Clausen: Making the Case for a Model Mental Health Advance Directive Statu
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
her to refuse needed intervention.6 The patient enters the arrangement when she
has capacity.7 A Ulysses arrangement authorizes doctors to treat the patient
during a future episode when the patient lacks capacity even if the episode causes
the patient to refuse treatment at that time. A patient who enters a Ulysses
arrangement essentially requests doctors to ignore the patient's illness-induced
refusals.9
The following story illustrates why Ulysses arrangements are needed to
facilitate intervention. Mr. Smith's daughter begged police to drive to her father's
house and transport him to the hospital. Diagnosed with bipolar disorder, he was
in the midst of an acute manic episode. His daughter had received letters from
him bragging about his upcoming role in a blockbuster film. When Mr. Smith
became manic, psychosis led him to a fantasy world in which he starred in a
movie filmed by hidden cameras. Police agreed to check on him to determine
whether he met the criteria for involuntary emergency detention and hospital
admission. Hours later, police informed her that although Mr. Smith acted
bizarrely, they could not transport him to the hospital against his will because his
behavior did not indicate that he was a danger to himself or others.
A week later, police found Mr. Smith in front of his apartment wearing only
underwear and darting into the street. Concerned that a car might hit him, the
police decided that he met the criteria and transported him to the hospital against
his will. Two weeks of inpatient treatment would bring Mr. Smith back to his
gentle self. But 72 hours later, as required by law, doctors discharged Mr. Smith
against medical advice even though he was still manic. They explained that he
demanded discharge and did not meet involuntary placement criteria. Days later,
police arrested Mr. Smith who was driving one hundred and twenty miles an hour
on a freeway. Psychosis made him believe that he was in a televised drag race.
The jail health clinic gave him lithium but failed to monitor his fluid intake. As a
6 See Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Care: A Theoretical and
Practical Overview for Legal Professionals, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y, & L. 746, 780 (1998)
(providing a sample Ulysses arrangement); I. Gremmen et al., Ulysses Arrangements in Psychiatry:
A Matter of Good Care?, 34 J. MED. ETHICs 77, 80 (2008) (preferring the term Ulysses
"arrangement" over Ulysses "contract" or "statement" because "contract" overemphasizes the
judicial aspects and "statement" has the connotation of a one-sided declaration); Chrisoula
Andreou, Making a Clean Break: Addiction and Ulysses Contracts, 22 BIOETHICS 1 (2008)
(arguing that there is a place for Ulysses contracts in managing addictive behavior).
7 Gremmen, supra note 6, at 77.
8 See Andreou, supra note 6, at 1. The arrangement derives its name from the main character
in Homer's epic poem Odyssey. Ulysses was afraid the Sirens' song would lead him into danger. He
directed his shipmates to tie him to the mast of his ship and not to release him, even if the Sirens'
song manipulated him to demand to be set free. In the mental health context, Ulysses contracts
"uphold the guidance provided by one's deepest identity conferring concerns" and potentially
prevent episodes from threatening the "self'. Theo Van Willigenburg & Patrick J.J. Belaere,
Protecting Autonomy as Authenticity Using Ulysses Contracts, J. MED. & PHIL. 395, 397 (2005).
9 See Breanna M. Sheetz, Comment, The Choice to Limit Choice: Using Psychiatric Advance
Directives to Manage the Effects of Mental Illness and Support Responsibility, 40 U. MICH. J.L.
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result he suffered lithium toxicity, making it medically unsafe for him to take
lithium. He must now rely on other treatments.
Before the onset of his illness, Mr. Smith was a mild-mannered accountant.
When he takes his medication, he is still that person. Manic episodes have given
him a criminal record and cost him his marriage, his career, two years of
commitment in a state psychiatric hospital, and his savings. Mr. Smith wants to
prevent further damage to his life by forming a Ulysses arrangement.
Acute episodes of mental illness often prevent people like Mr. Smith from
realizing they are sick and cause them to refuse treatment.'o Once an episode
causes a person to refuse care, the primary means of obtaining treatment is
through involuntary commitment." Even in the midst of acute episodes that have
temporarily destroyed capacity, many people do not meet commitment criteria
because they are not likely to injure themselves or others and are still able to care
for their basic needs.12 Requiring a person to reach a state that meets involuntary
commitment criteria can postpone intervention until it is too late.' 3
This Article proposes a solution that empowers people to control their mental
illnesses. Part I places mental health directives in context and begins with a
description of the types of advance directives. Section I.B explains civil
commitment law because a basic understanding of commitment law is necessary
to appreciate the need for Ulysses arrangements. Section I.C explores the key
benefit of Ulysses arrangements: to intervene early and avoid involuntary
commitment. Then, it explores the benefits of mental health directives generally.
Section I.D identifies and addresses concerns that Ulysses arrangements are
paternalistic, create opportunities for abuse, violate due process, fail to provide
contemporaneous informed consent, and destroy privacy.
Part II explores key provisions of the Uniform Act and state statutes. Section
II.B compares the Uniform Act and state mental health directive statutes,
10 See KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR OF MOODS AND MADNESS 36
(1995); Joanmarie I. Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo's Nest: Why Do Courts Continue to Rely on
Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1009 (2002) (asserting that inability to
accept that one is mentally ill is a symptom of the disease); NAT'L ETHICS COMM.,VETERANS
HEALTH ADMIN., ADVANCE DIRECTIVES FOR MENTAL HEALTH: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF STATE LAWS &
IMPLICATtONS FOR VHA PoLIcY, NAT'L CENTER FOR ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE, U.S. DEP'T VETERANS
AFF. 8 (Feb. 2008), http://www.ethics.va.gov/docs/necrpts/NECReport_20080220_Adv_
Directives MH-Analysis of StateLaws-Implications forVHAPolicy.pdf [hereinafter VHA
Report] (asserting that patients entering a mania may not recognize they are sick and may refuse
treatment).
11 See Sheetz, supra note 9, at 415.
12 See infra Section I.C.
13 Nick Anderson, Dr. Jekyll's Waiver of Mr. Hyde's Right to Refuse Medical Treatment:
Washington's New Law Authorizing Mental Health Care Advance Directives Needs Additional
Protections, 78 WASH. L. REV. 795, 801 (2003) (relaying testimony summarized by a legislative
assistant); Davoli, supra note 10, at 1045 (citing Ashok K. Malla et al., Improving Outcomes in
Schizophrenia: The Case for Early Intervention, 160 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 843, 844 (1999) for the
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concluding that neither adequately empowers patients to form Ulysses
arrangements. Section II.C illustrates why the Uniform Act's minimal execution
requirements expose patients to risks of coercion, fraud, and undue influence.
Section II.D commends the Uniform Act's patient designated activation because
it facilitates early intervention. Section II.E discusses when automatic expiration
of mental health directives may be appropriate. Section II.F illustrates that the
Uniform Act's lack of guidance on mental health treatments combined with
unchecked authority to automatically selected surrogates undermines patient
autonomy and potentiates abuse.
Part III explains key provisions of a model mental health directive statute set
forth in Appendix A that empower patients to enter Ulysses arrangements and
safeguard against abuse.
I. MENTAL HEALTH DIRECTIVES IN CONTEXT
This Part describes the status quo, which must be understood to better
appreciate the need for a model statute that empowers patients to form Ulysses
arrangements. Section L.A explores types of directives and explains the context in
which mental health directives are implemented. Section I.B gives an overview
of civil commitment law which is often the only intervention available for
patients unable to form Ulysses arrangements. Section I.C explains the key
benefit of a Ulysses arrangement: to intervene early and avoid commitment. Then
it explains the benefits of mental health directives generally. Section I.D
identifies and addresses concerns about Ulysses arrangements.
A. Types ofDirectives
Advance directives come in various forms.14 Instructional directives enable a
patient (also known as the principal) to instruct doctors to administer care when
the patient lacks capacity to provide informed consent.' Capacity, a key concept
in this Article, refers to the capacity to make and communicate health care
decisions and to "understand the significant benefits, risks, and alternatives" to
proposed treatment.16 Proxy directives allow a patient to appoint an agent to
make health care decisions for the patient when the patient is incapacitated.' 7
Hybrid directives contain instructions and designate agents.' 8 Patients use these
forms of directives for physical as well as mental illness.19 Directives intended to
14 Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives: Having One's Say, 89 Ky. L.J. 328,
347-54 (2001).
15 See John Q. La Fond & Deborah Srebnik, The Impact of Mental Health Advance Directives
on Patient Perceptions of Coercion in Civil Commitment and Treatment Decisions, 25 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 537-40 (2002).
16 UHCDA § 1(3).
17 102 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 25 (last updated Sept. 2013).
18 La Fond & Srebnik, supra note 15, at 541.
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plan for episodes of mental illness are called mental health directives. 20 The
Ulysses arrangement is a special type of mental health directive that is
irrevocable during periods of incapacity and enables the patient to consent in
advance to treatment despite illness-induced refusals. 2 1 Acute episodes of mental
illness often act directly to deprive patients of capacity and can distort judgment
more than physical illnesses of similar severity.22 Such episodes often cause
patients to refuse treatment to which they would consent if they were not
influenced by the episode.2 3 For this reason, clinicians implement mental health
directives, including Ulysses arrangements, in a different context than they
implement general advance directives (generic directives).2 4 Professor Patricia
Backlar stated that a generic directive attempts to guarantee a "good death" while
a mental health directive endeavors to secure a "good life." 25 Generally, doctors
implement instructions regarding end-of-life treatment contained in a generic
26directive when the patient is in a coma. Unlike comatose patients, a patient in
the midst of an acute mental illness episode is capable of taking affirmative
actions, which suggests the need for a different precautionary scenario. Doctors
often must implement mental health directives during episodes in which the
patient is not only conscious but unruly.27 In the midst of such episodes, patients
may adamantly refuse treatment requested in their directives. 2 8 Moreover, people
with chronic terminal illness are more likely to receive treatment from doctors
with whom they have established relationships than are people with episodic
mental illness. Acute episodes of mental illness can induce people to travel, and
they often receive treatment for acute episodes of mental illness in emergency
rooms or, after arrest, in jails.29 It is essential that mental health directives arc
20 See Richard A. Van Dorn et al., Reducing Barriers to Completing Psychiatric Advance
Directives, 35 ADMIN. & POL'Y MENTAL HEALTH 440, 448 (2008).
21 See Dunlap, supra note 14, at 352-55.
22 Id.
23 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24 Patricia Backlar, Anticipatory Planning for Psychiatric Treatment Is Not Quite the Same as
Planning for End-of-lhfe Care, 33 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 262 (1997).
25 Id. at 261-62.
26 See David Y. Nakashima, Comment, Your Body, Your Choice: How Mandatory Advance
Health-Care Directives Are Necessary to Protect Your Fundamental Right to Accept or Refuse
Medical Treatment, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 201, 202-03 (2004) (discussing In re Guardianship of
Schaivo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), in which the family of a woman in a
persistent vegetative state battled over whether she should be kept alive through artificial means
and stating that generic directives address situations like persistent vegetative states); Dunlap,
supra note 14, at 356-58.
27 Robert D. Miller, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Treatment: A View from the
Trenches, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 728, 734 (1998).
28 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
29 See PETE EARLEY, CRAZY: A FATHER'S SEARCH THROUGH AMERICA'S MENTAL HEALTH
MADNESS 2-3 (2006) (The largest public mental health facility in America is the Los Angeles
County jail, which on any given day houses 3000 mentally disturbed inmates); Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Special Report: Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates, OFF. JUST.
7
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enforceable wherever patients receive care.
The Uniform Act focuses on the typical end-of-life situation.3 0 The
Commissioners approved the Uniform Act because state laws for advance
directives were incomplete, inconsistent, and confusing. 3 ' The Commissioners
are all practicing attorneys, judges, legislators, legislative staff, or law professors
appointed by state governments to research, craft, and promote uniform state
laws in areas where uniformity is desirable and practical.32 At the time the
Uniform Act was issued, every state had one or more statutes regarding health
care powers of attorney, living wills, or other forms of proxy decision-making.33
Often, these statutes were incomplete because they only addressed a narrow set
of issues or were overly formalistic and difficult for patients to follow.3 4 The
primary goals of the Uniform Act were to support patient autonomy by creating a
simplified uniform process to facilitate use of advance directives and provide a
method for making health care decisions when patients fail to plan.35 The
Commissioners simplified the formation process by dispensing with obstacles to
directive formation such as requirements for a signed, witnessed, notarized
writing.36 The Uniform Act purported to be a comprehensive statutory scheme
addressing all health care planning. 37 With its focus on end-of-life, the Uniform
Act is not suited to the mental health context for a host of reasons explored in
Part II of this paper. Most importantly, the Uniform Act does not expressly
authorize patients to specify whether they may revoke their directives when they
lack capacity.38 It also does not expressly require capacity for revocation. 39 This
is probably why the Uniform Act provides no guidance for administration of
treatment pursuant to an irrevocable directive in the face of illness-induced
refusals. For these reasons, the Uniform Act does not empower patients to form
Ulysses arrangements. Without a Ulysses arrangement, a patient whose illness
causes him to revoke his directive and refuse treatment has no mechanism to
secure intervention unless he meets involuntary commitment criteria.
Even though state mental health directive statutes typically prohibit
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf (last updated Dec.
14, 2006) (In 2005, more than half of all inmates had a mental health problem.).
30 See infra Part II.
31 David M. English, The Unform Health-Care Decisions Act and its Progress in the States,
15 PROB. &PROP. 19 (2001).




33 Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1238.
34 Id.
35 English, supra note 31, at 20.
36 UHCDA § 2(a) (specifying that individual instructions "may be oral or written").
37 English, supra note 31, at 20.
38 See UHCDA § 3 (describing revocation procedures, none of which allow principals to
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incapacitated patients from revoking their directives, they do not empower
patients to form Ulysses arrangements. These statutes do not set forth procedures
for treating patients pursuant to Ulysses arrangements. The insufficient protection
that mentally ill patients receive from these statutes will be discussed at greater
length in Section II.B. Without a process for administering treatment pursuant to
a Ulysses arrangement, providers will discharge patients who demand discharge
even if their irrevocable directives consent to treatment. This is because without a
statute authorizing clinicians to administer treatment pursuant to a Ulysses
arrangement, clinicians will refuse to admit and treat in the face of the patient's
refusals. Doing so could expose the clinician or hospital to liability for various
torts, including violating informed consent, assault, battery, false imprisonment,
statutory violations, and federal civil rights violations explored in Section I.C.
B. Civil Commitment
If a patient is unable to form a Ulysses arrangement, the primary means
of obtaining intervention during an episode that causes him to refuse treatment is
through involuntary civil commitment. 40 The state's authority to commit people
with mental illness derives from two components of sovereignty. 4 1 The first is the
police power, which is the authority to maintain peace and order. 42 The state can
confine a person who is likely to be dangerous to others.43 The second is the
parens patriae power, which enables the state to protect a person whose mental
illness makes her likely to harm herself or prevents her from being able to care
for her basic needs."
Criteria
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, civil commitment imposes a "massive
curtailment of liberty'AS that warrants strict commitment criteria. The Supreme
Court decided that the clear and convincing evidence standard meets due process
guarantees for civil commitment proceedings, but the preponderance of the
evidence standard is inadequate.4 6
For police power commitment, states typically require the government to
show that because of mental illness, the person is a danger to others.47 First, the
40 Sheetz, supra note 9, at 415.




45 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131 (1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92
(1980); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
46 Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33.
47 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 23, 705 (5th ed. 2008).
9
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state must prove the person suffers from a mental illness or disorder,48 often
defined as a substantial disorder of the emotional processes, thought or cognition
that grossly impairs judgment, behavior or capacity to recognize reality.4 9
Second, most states require proof that mental illness caused the dangerousness. 50
Third, the government must prove the dangerousness itself.5' The standards for
dangerousness vary by jurisdiction. For instance, in Florida the government must
show a substantial likelihood that in the near future the person will inflict serious
bodily harm on another person, as evidenced by recent behavior causing,
attempting, or threatening such harm. 5 2 Florida is one of several states that
demand a finding of an overt act as a prerequisite to involuntary civil
commitment. Not all jurisdictions have an overt act requirement.5 4
For parens patriae commitment, states generally require the government to
prove that mental illness caused the person to be a danger to herself or rendered
her unable to provide for her basic needs. 5 Generally, states use the same
definition of mental illness or disorder as used for police power commitment.56
Two categories of people are potentially subject to parens patriae commitment.
The first is people at risk of suicide or self-harm caused by provocation of
others.57 The second is people whose illnesses render them unable to provide for
their basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter. Typically, states that have an
overt act requirement for police power commitment have the requirement for
parens patriae commitment.59
For both types of involuntary commitment, almost all states require
consideration of less restrictive alternatives to involuntary hospitalization 6 0 that
48 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 (1992); SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 723;
William P. Coyle, Cause of Action Against Psychiatrist in State-Operated Psychiatric Facility for
Improper Civil Commitment, in 10 CAUSES ACTION 2D 1, §4 (last updated Oct. 2013).
49 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 723; see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3(0) (2013).
50 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 726.
51 Id. at 726-42 (generally addressing dangerousness); Coyle, supra note 48, at § 4; see, e.g.,
In re B.T., 891 A.2d 1193 (N.H. 2006) (requiring evidence of dangerous conduct and stating the
psychiatrist's finding of a dangerous mental condition is insufficient for involuntary commitment).
52 FLA. STAT. § 394.467(l)(b) (2013).
53 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-2946(f) (2013); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
54 Matthew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ill. 1978); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW 119 (2d ed. 2005).
55 SLOBOG[N ET AL., supra note 47, at 705.
56 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
57 DONALD H.J. HERMANN, MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 159 (1997).
58 PERLIN, supra note 54, at 125 (This form of parens patriae commitment is often called
"gravely disabled."); Doe v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 657 F.2d 1017 (9th
Cir. 1981) (stating that the gravely disabled standard meets constitutional standards but cautioning
against overbroad construction).
59 HERMANN, supra note 57, at 161.
60 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 782; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.467(l)(b) (2013)
(prohibiting involuntary commitment without a finding that all available less restrictive treatment
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allow for care and prevent danger, such as outpatient treatment, day or night
treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody of a loved one, or home health
61services.
Procedures
Emergency Detention and Screening
All states authorize involuntary emergency admission and evaluation without
a full adjudicatory commitment hearing. 62 This is the most common way a person
enters the civil commitment process.6 3 Usually, either police apprehend and
transport the person to a facility or family transports the person. 64 Typically,
statutes authorize police to detain and transport to a hospital a person that the
officer concludes meets emergency detention and screening criteria, which are
essentially the same criteria for involuntary commitment.65 Then, a doctor at the
receiving facility examines the person to determine if emergency treatment is
necessary to protect the safety of the person or others. 66 States vary as to who
may authorize involuntary emergency admission.67 For example, in Virginia,
only a magistrate may authorize emergency admission, but in Florida, a doctor
can.68 States also impose strict time limits under which a person may be subject
to involuntary admission and examination. 6 9 For example, in Florida, within 72
hours from the time the person arrives at the facility, a mental health professional
must examine the person to determine if she meets involuntary placement
criteria.70 If the person fails to meet the criteria, the facility must release her
unless the person provides informed consent to remain as a voluntary patient.
Involuntary Admission
Every state has formal adjudicatory procedures for involuntary
commitment. 72 Each state requires a formal commitment hearing, 73 with notice7 4
61 Randolph v. Cervantes, 950 F. Supp. 771, 777 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
62 HERMANN, supra note 57, at 165.
63 Id. at 146-48.
64 Coyle, supra note 48, at § 2.
65 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.463(2) (2013).
66 Id. § 394.463.
67 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 807.
68 FLA. STAT. § 394.463 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-809 (2013).
69 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 811; see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §37.2-809 (stating the
duration of temporary detention shall not exceed 48 hours before there is a hearing).
70 FLA. STAT. § 394.463(2) (2013).
71 Id.
72 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 705.
73 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6) (2013) (hearing to be held within five days).
74 See, e.g., ID. § 394.4599 (2013).
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and counsel, and mandates periodic reviews of the legal status of committed
respondents to evaluate whether they continue to meet commitment criteria.76 I
most states, a judge makes the decision to commit, but many states enable the
respondent to request a jury trial.77 Commitment hearings are often
dehumanizing. 8 Many states either provide for private proceedings or allow
exclusion of the respondent if being present could be harmful to the respondent.
Generally, states require a review hearing after initial commitment, usually from
between three months to a year after admission.80 A respondent can obtain
judicial review through habeas corpus.
Voluntary Admission
States allow for voluntary admission for inpatient mental health treatment
without a hearing. 82 According to some estimates, over half of psychiatric
inpatient admissions are voluntary. Most clinicians prefer voluntary over
involuntary admission because: (1) voluntary patients are more likely to
cooperate in treatment; (2) voluntary admission is less stigmatizing; and (3)
involuntary commitment proceedings squander medical and judicial resources.84
Generally, courts and legislatures also prefer voluntary treatment.8 1 Critics of
voluntary admission argue that admission is not truly voluntary because family
and doctors frequently coerce patients to admit themselves to avoid involuntary
commitment, 86 and patients often lack the capacity necessary to consent to
admission.87
75 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 5 (2013).
76 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 705.
77 Id. at 820. Nebraska is one of a small number of states allowing an administrative board to
commit. NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-915 (2013).
78 Karna Halverson, Voluntary Admission and Treatment of Incompetent Persons with a
Mental Illness, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 161, 162 (2005).
79 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a) (2013); SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 827.
80 Fasulo v. Arafeh, 378 A.2d 553 (1977); SLOBOGIN ETAL., supra note 47, at 852.
81 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.459 (2013).
82 See, e.g., id. § 394.4625 (2013) (providing procedures for voluntary admission and
requiring discharge of voluntary patients who request discharge).
83 See Halverson, supra note 78, at 163 n.4.
84 Id. at 164.
85 Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: a Story of
Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 116 n.305 (1991).
86 See, e.g., In re Tiffin, 646 N.E.2d 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (discussing a statute prohibiting
statements that the patient may be subject to involuntary commitment if she does not admit
herself); see also Halverson, supra note 78, at 166-68 (exploring arguments against voluntary
admission including potential for patient coercion and lack of an adversarial process and attorney
representation).
87 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 113 (1990); Perlin, supra note 85, at 117
(asserting that because most statutes fail to define the competency required for a valid voluntary
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C. Benefits of Mental Health Directives
This section first illustrates how Ulysses arrangements empower patients to
intervene early and avoid commitment. Next, it enumerates the benefits of mental
health directives, which include documenting informed consent (which in turn
protects clinicians and facilitates treatment), improving care, safeguarding rights
to refuse treatment, and avoiding guardianship.
Intervene Early and Avoid Involuntary Commitment
Forming a Ulysses arrangement is critical for some patients because it is the
only effective intervention mechanism for episodes that compromise their ability
to recognize their need for treatment. Involuntary commitment is the most
common way patients without directives obtain intervention during an episode.8 8
As explored below, Ulysses arrangements are superior to involuntary
commitment because involuntary commitment comes too late and is often
traumatic; the proceedings can be dehumanizing; and police apprehension can be
dangerous.
The first reason early intervention through a Ulysses arrangement is better
than involuntary commitment is that involuntary commitment comes too late.
One patient testified, "When someone is allowed to decompose so severely
before they can get help under the involuntary treatment act, they never come
back quite the same."89 Pete Earley chronicled his struggles navigating the
labyrinth of the mental health system for his son whose illness prevented him
from recognizing he needed treatment:
My son was so out of control the nurse called hospital security. I was
glad. Maybe now they will medicate him, I thought. But before the
security guard arrived, Mike dashed outside, cursing loudly. I went after
him. Meanwhile, the doctor told my ex-wife it was not illegal for
someone to be mentally ill in Virginia. But it was illegal for him to treat
them unless they consented. There was nothing he could do. "Even if he
is psychotic?" She asked. "Yes." Mike couldn't forcibly be treated, the
doctor elaborated, until he hurt himself or someone else.90
The second reason intervention through a Ulysses arrangement is superior to
involuntary commitment is that involuntary hospitalization in a state hospital
often traumatizes patients.91 Patients may suffer symptoms of posttraumatic
88 Sheetz, supra note 9, at 414.
89 Anderson, supra note 13, at 801.
90 EARLEY, supra note 29, at 16.
91 Cf Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of
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stress disorder after discharge from a state psychiatric hospital.92 Loved ones can
only visit during limited hours.9 3 There has been evidence of staff members
verbally and even physically assaulting patients. 9 4 For these reasons, patients
may want to consent to admission, at the first signs of an acute episode in a
private hospital. Generally, patients prefer treatment from their psychiatrists
whom they trust and who know their history.9 5
The third reason to avoid involuntary commitment through a Ulysses
arrangement is that involuntary commitment proceedings can be time-
consuming, highly intrusive, and demeaning. 9 6 I commitment hearings, patients
may witness the testimony of loved ones about the patient's behaviors during
acute episodes. Patients may feel like the accused in a criminal trial.
Finally, a Ulysses arrangement potentially enables people suffering from
acute episodes to avoid police apprehension, which is the typical way a person
enters the commitment process. 97 For the mentally ill, police encounters can be
dangerous.98 For example, in Drummond v. City of Anaheim, a police encounter
with Drummond, a nonviolent person with bipolar disorder and schizophrenia,
resulted in officers brutally knocking Drummond unconscious, ultimately leaving
Drummond in a vegetative state.99
Document Informed Consent, Protecting Clinicians and Facilitating and
Improving Care
Under modem informed consent law, physicians must provide patients
relevant information about the risks and benefits of any proposed treatment and
obtain the patient's informed consent before administering treatment. 00 Applying
09.pdf (reporting on an investigation of Georgia's state-run psychiatric hospitals). The Department
found that Georgia's facilities "continue to provide deficient services that subject patients both to
actual harm, and to excessive risk of serious harm, including: (1) inadequate protection from harm;
(2) inappropriate mental health treatment; (3) inappropriate seclusion and restraints; [and] (4)
inadequate medical care."
92 Cf Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190, 1195-97 (1974)
("[H]ospitalization itself interferes with privacy, since the patient cannot shield himself from
constant observation by both his fellow patients and staff .... ).
93 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1975).
94 Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 92, at 1197 ("Furthermore, patients in
[state] hospitals risk brutality at the hands of their fellow residents and even their attendants . . . .").
95 Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments for Those with Mental Illness, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 57, 68-69 (1996).
96 Id.
97 See HERMANN, supra note 57, at 165; SLOBOGIN et al., supra note 47, at 806.
98 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
99 Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1055 (2003).
100 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-11 (2d ed. 2000); Cruzan v. Director, Miss.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (stating that the informed consent doctrine is firmly
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the informed consent doctrine in the mental health context is problematiclo
because, during certain phases of their illnesses, psychiatric patients may lack the
capacity required to provide informed consent.' 02 As the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged in Zinermon v. Burch, mental illness creates special problems
regarding informed consent. 03 The nature of mental illness makes it foreseeable
that a person needing treatment will be unable to understand forms he is being
asked to sign and unable to make a knowing and voluntary decision concerning
admission and treatment.' For patients with mental illness, capacity is often a
fluid concept. 0 5 There are no clear legal guidelines as to what constitutes
capacity.106 This fluidity negatively impacts their ability to obtain treatment
because doctors are rightfully concerned about administering treatment without
informed consent.
When a patient with no directive becomes incapacitated, the doctor may only
administer treatment by following procedures for involuntary admission and
treatment or obtaining consent from a court-appointed guardian if the court has
found the patient legally incompetent.107 Without following such procedures,
physicians who admit and treat a patient without informed consent are potentially
liable for various torts, including the independent cause of action of lack of
informed consent,'08 assault,109 battery,' 10 negligence, and false imprisonment.
Moreover, many state mental health codes allow patients to file claims against
any person who violates the patient's rights by, for example, admitting an
incapacitated patient under voluntary admission procedures.12 Patients of state
operated facilities may also have federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (section 1983) for due process violations if the facility admitted and
treated the patient without either obtaining informed consent or following
procedures for involuntary admission and treatment." 3
As a record of informed consent, the directive enables the physician to admit
and treat the patient during episodes when capacity is in doubt. Directives
therefore protect facilities and clinicians from liability for claims based on
101 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 290.
102 Id.
103 Zinermon v. Burch, 49 US 113, 133 (1990).
104 Id.
105 Halverson, supra note 78, at 171 ("[E]ach patient has his or her own unique mental
capabilities. In addition, a patient's mental status can fluctuate in any given day, week, month or
year.").
106 Id. ("[T]here is no universal definition or method of determining competency.").
107 SLOBOGiN ET AL., supra note 47, at 290.
108 See, e.g., McCroskey v. University of Tennessee, 1995 WL 329133 at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995); Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1052 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
109 Coyle, supra note 48, at § 25.
110 See, e.g., Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 564 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Gragg v.
Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
111 Coyle, supra note 48, at § 24.
112 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.459(8)(b) (2013).
113 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 113 (1990).
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admitting and treating a patient without informed consent. The directive allows
the doctor to treat a psychotic patient who does not meet involuntary
commitment criteria.' 14 Moreover, the Uniform Act and state mental health
directive statutes provide immunity from civil or criminal liability or from
discipline for unprofessional conduct for clinicians and facilities that administer
treatment pursuant to a directive."'
Zinermon v. Burchll6 illustrates how directives might protect facilities and
doctors from liability. Police found Burch, bruised, bloodied, and disoriented,
wandering along a highway and transported him to a private facility designated
by Florida to receive mentally ill patients.' 17 Staff evaluation indicated that Burch
was psychotic." 8 In this condition, he signed forms consenting to voluntary
admission." 9 He remained in the facility for three days, was diagnosed with
paranoid schizophrenia, and was administered psychotropic medication.120 Staff
determined he needed longer-term stabilization and referred him to a state
psychiatric hospital.121 There, he again signed forms requesting voluntary
admission and treatment even though the report of the clinician at the state
hospital asserted Burch remained psychotic.122 Clerks simply had Burch execute
voluntary admission forms, and the facility considered him a voluntary patient.12 3
He remained at the state hospital for five months.124 During that time, he did not
have benefit of counsel.12 5 No hearing was held where he could challenge his
admission and treatment.126
After discharge, Burch filed a section 1983 claim against doctors,
administrators, and staff at the state hospital.12 7 He alleged they deprived him of
liberty without due process by admitting him as a voluntary patient when they
knew or should have known he lacked capacity.128 Florida law prohibited
voluntary admission of an incapacitated patient.129 However, Florida failed to
require a capacity determination in the course of voluntary admission.3 o No one
114 See Elizabeth A. Rosenfeld, Mental Health Advance Directives: A False Sense of
Autonomy for the Nation's Aging Population, 9 ELDER L.J. 53, 59-60 (2001).
115 UHCDA § 9(a)(3); see, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 71.32.170 (2013) (granting providers
immunity for following a directive in good faith and without negligence).
116 494 U.S. 113 (1990).




121 Id. at ll8-19.
122 Id. at 119-20.
123 Id at 134.
124 Id. at 120.
125 Id. at 121.
126 Id. at 120.
127 Id. at 114-15.
128 Id at 121 n.3.
129 Id. at 135.
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evaluated Burch to determine whether he had capacity to provide informed
consent.' 31 Burch argued staff should have provided him procedural safeguards
required by the Due Process Clause and Florida law for involuntary admission.13 2
The Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the section 1983 claim but held
it was justiciable.133 Exploration of the Court's analysis of procedural due process
case law is outside the scope of this Article.134 However, the Court's discussion
sheds light on the value of mental health directives. The Court stated that even if
facilities are usually justified in taking at face value a person's request for
admission for medical treatment, they might not be justified in doing so without
further inquiry as to a mentally ill person's request for treatment in a mental
hospital.135 Many people with mental illness lack capacity to give informed
consent but do not meet commitment criteria' 36 because they are not likely to
injure themselves or others and are still able to care for their basic needs.
The Court discussed the involuntary commitment procedures necessary to
prevent the confinement of mentally ill people who are harmless and can live
safely outside the facility.' 3 7 Involuntary confinement of these harmless
individuals would violate the Constitution.' 3 8 If Burch had had an involuntary
commitment hearing, he might not have met commitment criteria.'39 A patient
willing to sign voluntary admission forms but lacking capacity to provide
informed consent could not be relied on to protest his voluntary admission and
demand adherence to involuntary placement procedures.140 Staff members were
the only people able to ensure procedural protections before depriving Burch of
his liberty by admitting him without his informed consent. 41 The State may
delegate to facility staff the power to admit patients, but the staff must provide
constitutionally required procedural safeguards and should not escape liability
when they fail to do so.142
If Burch had a directive of which the facility was aware, the parties might
have avoided litigation. If he did not want to be admitted even when he was
psychotic, his directive could have made his refusal clear. Staff would have
realized voluntary admission was not an option. To admit and treat Burch, they
had to adhere to involuntary placement procedures. On the other hand, if Burch
wanted doctors to treat him when he was psychotic, his directive could have
documented his informed consent, enabling the facility to "voluntarily" admit
131 Id. at 113.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 149-51.
134 Id. at 117.
135 Id. at 133 n.18.
136 Id. at 122.
137 Id. at 133-34.
138 Id. (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)).
139 Id. at 134.
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and treat him.14 3 Modem advance directive statutes would provide immunity
from civil or criminal liability for administering treatment pursuant to the
directive.'"
Zinermon illustrates that doctors can be punished if they admit and treat
patients whose capacity is in question without following an "elaborate
involuntary admission process." 45 As the Supreme Court acknowledged, a
psychotic patient may not meet involuntary commitment criteria.14 6 A directive is
the only way patients can obtain intervention during an episode that temporarily
destroys capacity. If a patient in the midst of an episode has no directive, the
facility cannot voluntarily admit and treat him because he lacks capacity. 14 If the
patient does not meet commitment criteria, even if he is psychotic, the facility
cannot admit and treat him.148
Directives not only document informed consent, they potentially improve
treatment. 149 Research indicates that mental health directives provide doctors
clinically useful information that can expedite and improve care. 50 For example,
a patient who has experienced lithium toxicity may use her directive to notify
doctors that administration of lithium could be dangerous. Moreover, the patient
may use her directive to provide instructions for personal matters such as caring
for pets in the event the patient is hospitalized. The comfort of knowing her pets
will be safe may encourage the patient to voluntarily remain in the hospital for
treatment until she is stable.
Safeguard Rights to Refuse Treatment
Courts have based a person's right to refuse medical treatment on various
constitutional, statutory, and common law sources. For example, in Cruzan v.
Missouri Department of Health, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a
competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing
unwanted medical treatment, including life-sustaining hydration and nutrition.'
Similarly, in Washington v. Harper, which involved involuntary medication of a
mentally ill inmate, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a significant liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause in avoiding unwanted administration of
antipsychotic medication.152 Other constitutional bases support the right to refuse
143 See supra Section I.C.
144 E.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 327G- 10 (2013); see Sheetz, supra note 9, at 431.
145 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 140 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra Section I.C.
146 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133.
147 Id. at 117; Perlin, supra note 85, at 118 (predicting that Zinermon would reduce voluntary
admissions at state hospitals).
148 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133-34 (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)).
149 Miller, supra note 27, at 735-37.
150 Debra S. Srebnik et al., The Content and Clinical Utility of Psychiatric Advance
Directives, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 592 (2005).
151 Cruzan v. Director, Miss. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990).
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treatment, including the "penumbral" right to privacy's protection of bodily
integrity. Moreover, the common law doctrine of informed consent,153 state
statutes,' 54 and state constitutions support a person's right to refuse mental health
treatments. 55
The right to form a directive is implicit in the right to refuse treatment
because a directive enables a person with capacity to prevent administration of
unwanted treatment when the person lacks capacity.15 6 In re Rosa M illustrates
why directives help safeguard rights to refuse treatment.' 5 7 In that case, the
director of a psychiatric hospital applied for an order authorizing
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) on an involuntarily committed patient. Rosa
M.'s psychiatrist opined that Rosa M.'s mental illness required treatment that
included ECT. However, Rosa M. lacked capacity to consent to ECT. State
regulations required authorization from an immediate family member or a court
order to administer ECT to a patient who lacked capacity to consent. When she
had capacity, Rosa M. had executed a directive refusing ECT. This directive
documented and therefore protected her right to refuse.' 5 8 The court held that
absent an overriding state interest, the hospital was required to honor her
competent rejection of ECT even after she had lost capacity.159
Avoid Guardianship
Guardianship can help people with mental illness obtain treatment during
episodes that destroy the capacity necessary to provide informed consent.16 0 The
guardianship process starts when the court receives a petition to determine the
incompetency of the ward and appoint a guardian.161 Many states allow any
interested person to initiate guardianship proceedings.' 62 If the court determines
the person is incompetent, a hearing takes place to determine whether the person
needs a guardian.' 63 If there is clear and convincing evidence of the need for a
guardian, the court appoints one either to make all legal decisions for the ward or
only specific types of decisions the ward is incompetent to make.&6
One advantage of a mental health directive is its potential to help the
153 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277.
154 Id.
155 Id.; Michael Flaherty, Nonconsensual Treatment of Involuntarily Committed Mentally [I
Persons with Neuroleptic or Antipsychotic Drugs as Violative of State Constitutional Guarantee, in
74 A.L.R.4th 1099 (last updated Oct. 2013).
156 Sheetz, supra note 9, at 423.
157 In re Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1991).
158 Id. at 545.
159 Id.
160 HERMANN, supra note 57, at 214.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 216.
164 Id. at 216-17.
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mentally ill avoid guardianship.1 65 People with mental illness often experience
long periods of full capacity and are capable of governing their lives and
treatment.166 Many patients do not want "any interested person" to initiate
proceedings for a judge to find them incompetent and appoint a guardian to make
their decisions. Incompetency adjudications, a form of deviance labeling, can
have seriously detrimental societal consequences and cause significant
psychological damage to the ward.16 8 Many patients would prefer to execute a
directive in which they can appoint an agent they trust to make decisions in line
with their values.' 69 While it may be difficult for a directive to address every
situation that may arise, the patient can engage in ongoing dialogue with the
agent to ensure the agent understands the patient's thoughts about treatment. 7 0 If
the directive fails to address an issue, the agent can make decisions in line with
the patient's values'17 and there will be no need for the court to appoint a
guardian.17 2
Some psychiatrists have asserted that guardianship poses a danger of
harming the patient's civil rights, autonomy, and independence.173 These
psychiatrists advised that doctors should recommend guardianship cautiously,
only as a last resort for patients who are severely incompetent.174 When the
situation is less extreme, physicians should recommend other alternatives, such
as mental health directives.
The process of creating a directive gives the patient a sense of empowerment
and encourages self-responsibility.176 The planning process is therapeutic because
it provides patients opportunities to analyze the patterns of their illnesses and
prevent crises.177 Studies indicate patients experience a high level of satisfaction
with intervention administered pursuant to a mental health directive.178
165 See Winick, supra note 95, at 84.
166 Miller, supra note 27, at 731; Sheetz, supra note 9, at 404; see, e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N , DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 123-39 (5th ed. 2013)
[hereinafter DSM-V] (explaining that bipolar disorder is episodic); TERRI CHENEY, MANIC: A
MEMOIR (2008).
167 See HERMANN, supra note 57, at 214.
168 Miller, supra note 27, at 736; Winick, supra note 95, at 84.
169 Winick, supra note 95, at 85.
170 Id. at 82.
171 See Dunlap, supra note 14, at 348 (asserting that a hybrid directive may be the most
effective way to effectuate the patient's desires).
172 See Winick, supra note 95, at 85.
173 Yuval Melamed et al., Guardianship for the Severely Mentally Ill, 19 MED. & L. 321, 325
(2000).
174 Id. at 325.
175 Id.
176 Sheetz, supra note 9, at 406-07.
177 Winick, supra note 95, at 81-82.
178 Eric B. Elbogen et al., Effectively Implementing Psychiatric Advance Directives to
Promote Self-Determination of Treatment Among People with Mental Illness, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 273, 275, 285 (2007) (reporting on a study revealing that subjects reported high
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Researchers theorize that patients with directives perceive treatment to be more
self-determined because directives allow patients to actively co-author
individualized mental-health crisis prevention plans. 79
D. Addressing Concerns About Ulysses Arrangements
Concerns
Despite the benefits of Ulysses arrangements, the concept of a self-binding
directive remains controversial. Detractors argue that Ulysses arrangements are
paternalistic.'"s This criticism is similar to concerns about parens patriae
commitment which enables the state to intervene in a person's decisions for her
benefit without regard to whether she presents a risk to others.'8 '
Critics also argue Ulysses arrangements create opportunities for undue
influence, abuse, and coercion by doctors and family.18 2 Mental illness has the
potential to wreak havoc not only on the patient, but also on the patient's loved
ones. There is a danger that family and treatment team members, desperate to
conquer the patient's illness, will coerce the patient into forming a Ulysses
arrangement that they will then use as a tool to intimidate the patient into
complying with a treatment regimen.' 83
Opponents argue the Ulysses arrangement violates due process because it
enables a doctor to forcibly hospitalize and treat a patient even when the patient
does not meet commitment criteria.184 Moreover, unlike in the civil commitment
context, doctors implement Ulysses arrangements without procedural protections
such as an adjudicatory hearing.' 8 1
Scholars also express concern about the risk of unanticipated consequences
due to a patient's change of heart or failure to foresee all contingencies.' 86
Moreover, critics argue that consent provided in a Ulysses arrangement is not
valid informed consent because it is not contemporaneous.' 87 They argue that
informed consent is a continuing process in which doctors must obtain consent
for each step of treatment.' 88 When doctors treat pursuant to a Ulysses
arrangement, they rely on expired consent.189
179 Id. at 274-75.
180 See Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of the
Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 777, 785-91 (1982).
181 Id. at 785.
182 See id. at 852; Winick, supra note 95, at 94.
183 See also Winick, supra note 95, at 87 (stating some people may wish to have a directive
refusing hospitalization made irrevocable to prevent family from pressuring them to revoke).
184 Dresser, supra note 180, at 800.
185 Id. at 813-14.
186 See Winick, supra note 95, at 88.
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Finally, detractors contend that to make Ulysses arrangements effective,
patients must waive their privacy by notifying doctors, employers, family, and
friends.190
Response
A distinction should be made between different types of paternalism. Ulysses
arrangements are instruments of self-paternalism, not state-paternalism, because
they implement a person's rational choices instead of her illness-induced
choices.191 This self-paternalism respects patient autonomy by empowering the
patient to direct her health care even during episodes that destroy the capacity
necessary to provide informed consent.1 9 2 Depriving patients of the right to form
Ulysses arrangements is itself a form of state-paternalism because it presumes to
decide for the patient what is best for her.
It is true that doctors implement Ulysses arrangements without the
procedural protections provided in civil commitment. However, the liberty
deprivation involved in implementing a Ulysses arrangement is minimal
compared to the deprivation of freedom involved in involuntary commitment, as
discussed in Section I.C. When doctors implement a Ulysses arrangement, they
follow a patient's advance written instructions.' 93 Involuntarily committed
patients do not provide advance consent. Because implementation of a Ulysses
arrangement involves hospitalizing a patient despite her contemporaneous
objections, the enabling statute should provide procedural protections.1 94 The
model provisions provide such protections because they: (1) limit self-binding
hospitalization to three weeks,' 95 (2) require doctors to heed treatment refusals
from patients with capacity, (3) require express written consent before
administering psychotropic medication in contravention of illness-induced
objections, (4) prohibit Ulysses arrangements for ECT and psychosurgery, and
(5) allow patients to seek injunctive relief.
While Ulysses arrangements may create opportunities for abuse, the potential
of the significantly more coercive environments of civil commitment and
incarceration outweighs concerns of coercion from family and doctors. To
protect against abuse, the enabling statute should impose safeguards to ensure
patients form Ulysses arrangements voluntarily and doctors implement Ulysses
arrangements in strict compliance with patient instructions. A patient with
capacity should always be able to revoke her Ulysses arrangement.1 96 This
190 Id. at 851.
191 Id.
192 See Willigenburg and Belaere, supra note 8, at 395-96.
193 Roberto Cuca, Ulysses in Minnesota: First Steps Toward a Self-Binding Psychiatric
Advance Directive Statute, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1152, 1153 (1993).
194 Id. at 1154, 1182-85.
195 See Dresser, supra note 180, at 781 n. 15 (stating that three weeks is the suggested length).
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Article's model provisions impose such safeguards including requirements for:
(1) capacity determinations at the time of directive formation and
implementation, (2) witnessing by multiple disinterested people, and (3) review
and approval by two psychiatrists before administering treatment pursuant to a
Ulysses arrangement.
To address concerns about unanticipated contingencies, patients and doctors
should engage in ongoing dialogue and update the directive to ensure it remains
current.' 97 The directive might also use broad language to enable doctors to
administer the most therapeutic treatment. For example, a directive could consent
to psychiatric medication generally, rather than specifying the particular
medication. Like this Article's model, the enabling statute should grant patients
the right to designate an agent who can implement the patient's wishes when
unforeseen contingencies occur. Moreover, the model provisions provide for
automatic expiration of Ulysses arrangements every two years. This mechanism
helps ensure the Ulysses arrangement continues to represent the patient's wishes.
Although informed consent provided through a Ulysses arrangement is
admittedly not truly contemporaneous, if patients are unable to form Ulysses
arrangements, they become victims of their illnesses. When an episode causes
them to refuse treatment, they cannot obtain intervention until they are deemed
dangerous as defined by the state commitment statute.'9 8 The Ulysses
arrangement empowers the patient to determine her care when she lacks capacity
to provide informed consent.199 Informed consent in the directive is valid because
Ulysses arrangements are only appropriate for patients who have already
experienced previous episodes and responded to treatment. 20 0 Mental illnesses
often follow a pattern that enables the patient and the doctor to predict the
intervention necessary to address future episodes.2 0' Moreover, automatic
expiration of Ulysses arrangements ensures the patient provided consent
relatively recently. This will be discussed in Section II.E.
The criticism that Ulysses arrangements destroy privacy, like the others,
presumes to weigh the benefits and risks of Ulysses arrangements for the patient.
Acute episodes damage patients' lives and health. Patients should be able to
decide that preventing future humiliating psychotic episodes that compromise
their privacy justifies disclosing the Ulysses arrangement to their inner circles.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE UNIFORM ACT AND STATE STATUTES
Part II explains key provisions of the Uniform Act and state advance
197 Winick, supra note 95, at 81-86.
198 Cuca, supra note 193, at 1152.
199 Id. at 1153.
200 Id.; Dresser, supra note 180, at 800-01 (stating that confinement based on a Ulysses
arrangement would allow for treatment that had been successful for the patient's past episodes).
201 Id. at 847-51 (asserting that it would not respect patient liberty to permit enforcement of
Ulysses arrangements where there is a high likelihood of predictive error).
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directive statutes. It illustrates that the Uniform Act, with its focus on end-of-life,
ignores the needs of people with mental illness. For example, the Uniform Act:
(1) does not empower patients to form Ulysses arrangements; (2) dispenses with
execution requirements which protect against abuse; (3) fails to provide guidance
on advance consent to common mental health treatments; (4) develops an
automatic surrogate selection system which exposes mental health patients to
undue risks; and (5) provides a template which is inappropriate in the mental
health context. In addition, this Part explains how key provisions of state advance
directive statutes fail to empower people with mental illness.
A. Specialized Statute or One Size Fits All Approach?
Before critiquing the Uniform Act, it is necessary to describe its primary
purpose and a few of its key provisions. The Uniform Act, approved in 1993,
strives to pave a health care decision-making superhighway.202 The doctrine of
informed consent gives people with capacity the right to determine their
20treatment.203 When patients lack capacity, they need a mechanism through which
to exercise control over their care. The Uniform Act provides this mechanism. It
allows an individual with capacity to give oral or written instructions to a
provider. 204 These instructions remain in force even after the person loses
capacity.205 The patient may also execute a written power of attorney for health
care that authorizes an agent to make health care decisions when the patient lacks
capacity.206 Moreover, a patient may orally designate a surrogate decision-
maker. 20 7 For patients who fail to plan, the Uniform Act sets forth a system for
automatically selecting a surrogate. 2 08 The surrogate is bound by the patient's
instructions or known wishes. 209 When there are none, the surrogate must act in
the patient's best interests.2 10
Only nine states211 have adopted the Uniform Act, likely because most states
do not want to revisit their existing advance health care planning legislation just
to make small improvements.2 12 Probably because mental illness planning
implicates different issues than end-of-life planning, half of the states enacted
202 Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1238.
203 See supra Part IC.
204 UHCDA § 2.
205 Id § 2(b), 7(d).
206 Id. § 2.
207 Id. § 5(b).
208 Id.
209 Id. §§ 2(e), 5(f).
210 Id. § §2(e), 5(f).
211 See ALA. STAT.§ 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-13 (2013); ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.010-.52.395
(2013); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4670-4743 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2518 (2013);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-1 to -16 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-801 to 5-817 (2013);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 4141-201 to -229 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-1 to -18 (2013); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §35-22401 to 35-22416 (2013) ; see also Stith, supra note 2, at 40 n.l.
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separate mental health directive statutes.21 3 Generic directive statutes govern
mental health directives in the remaining states.214 The Uniform Act is a model
generic directive statute because it is not a specialized mental health directive
statute. Instead, it purports to govern all advance health care planning, for both
physical and mental illness.2 15 Generic directive statutes focus on end-of-life
216
issues. For example, Florida has no separate mental health directive statute.
The legislative findings of Florida's generic directive statute address end-of-life
and palliative care but fail to mention psychotropic medication or ECT.2 17
Similarly, the recommended statutory forms in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Alaska
for health care instructions make the instructions effective when the physician
determines the patient has a terminal condition or is in a persistent vegetative
state.218 This provision is inappropriate for patients who need their mental health
directives to take effect when they lose capacity due to an acute episode.
Moreover, the provision is potentially confusing and upsetting for otherwise
healthy patients with mental illness. Having to confront emotionally charged end-
of-life issues at the same time as a mental health patient plans for the next
episode might be disturbing for an already vulnerable patient.
The Uniform Act and state generic directive statutes created for end-of-life
situations fail to address issues people with mental illness frequently face. This
void burdens patients and hospitals with unnecessary litigation. In Cohen v.
Bolduc, 2 19 litigation escalated to the level of the state Supreme Court. Because
Massachusetts had no mental health directive statute, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court had to address whether the state general health care proxy statute
authorized an agent to commit a principal to a mental health facility.220 The
patient's proxy was activated in the summer of 2000.221 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court did not issue its decision until January of 2002.222 Undoubtedly,
the patient, her family, and her hospital wasted time and incurred unnecessary
expense and emotional strain when the parties had to bring their case all the way
to the state Supreme Court to resolve an avoidable situation. Of course, enacting
a mental health directive statute will not obviate litigation. However, when
mental health questions arise, courts will have the benefit of legislative
213 See Cohen v. Bolduc, 760 N.E.2d 714, 719 (Mass. 2002); VHA Report, supra note 10, at
3, 14-15 (listing Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming).
214 See VHA Report, supra note 10, at 3.
215 UHCDA § 1(5).
216 FLA. STAT. §§ 765.101-.205 (2013).
217 Id. § 765.102 (2013).
218 See VHA Report, supra note 10, at 3; ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.010 (2013); 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. §43/5 (2013); Wis. STAT. § 155.05 (2013).
219 760 N.E.2d 714, 719 (Mass. 2002).
220 Id. at 715.
221 Id. at 716.
222 Id. at 714.
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guidance.22 3
When a court applies a generic directive statute in a mental health crisis, the
court is in the untenable position of interpreting a law intended to address end-of-
life care, not mental illness. For instance, in the Cohen case, the court had to
decide whether commitment authority was implicit in the generic directive
statutory scheme.224 The health care proxy statute defined "health care" to
include any treatment, service or procedure to diagnose or treat the patient's
physical or mental condition. 225 From this reference to mental conditions, the
court decided that the legislature did not intend to limit the agent's authority.226
As Cohen acknowledged, the legislature had never addressed the commitment
issue.227 The Court was forced to survey other states' mental health directive
statutes, which were split as to whether an agent possessed commitment
authority. 2 28 Cohen looked to the Uniform Act, which only allows an agent or
surrogate to commit if the principal expressly provided commitment authority in
a written directive. 2 29 Other state legislatures, whose statutory definitions of
health care included treatment of mental conditions, decided that an agent did not
have commitment authority. 23 0
In a legislative vacuum, the Cohen court made a policy decision that express
commitment authority is not required for an agent to commit the principal.2 31
Cohen made this policy decision despite the fact that several state advance
directive statutes prohibit an agent from committing a principal. 23 2 Reasonable
lawmakers disagree on the issue. 23 3 Cohen underscores the need for a model
mental health directive statute for state elected officials to adopt, enabling elected
lawmakers to give guidance on key mental health issues. The process of enacting
a mental health directive statute requires the legislature to address issues
implicated in advance planning for acute episodes. When the legislature
considers the proposed legislation, it will review testimony from experts and
stakeholders, including psychiatrists and patients. This process will enable the
legislature to develop sound policy for the state.234
223 See infra Part III.
224 Cohen, 760 N.E.2d at 719-20.
225 Id. at 720.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 718.
228 Id. at 718-19.
229 Id. at 718 n.14.
230 Id. at 718 n.15.
231 Id. at 721.
232 Id. at 718.
233 Id.
234 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 13, at 801 (exploring patient testimony before the
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B. Revocation and Ulysses Arrangements
Requirements for a Ulysses Enabling Statute
To empower patients to form Ulysses arrangements, the enabling statute
must have a few key components. First, it must enable patients to choose to form
a directive that is irrevocable during periods of incapacity. A patient who cannot
form an irrevocable directive cannot enter a Ulysses arrangement. Because
episodes often cause patients to refuse treatment and revoke their directives,
irrevocable directives are necessary to enable patients to secure treatment despite
contemporaneous refusals.235
However, allowing patients to form irrevocable directives does not, in and of
itself, empower patients to form Ulysses arrangements. The enabling statute must
set forth procedures for administering treatment in the face of contemporaneous
objections. 2 36 Without a well-defined process and clear authority, a doctor
typically will not force treatment on a refusing patient based only on the fact that
her directive is irrevocable when she lacks capacity. Even with the typical
statutory statement of provider immunity, doctors will be rightfully concerned
about liability for unlawfully administering involuntary treatment.
Physician reluctance to treat in the face of contemporaneous objections is not
the only concern. A more serious concern involves risks of coercion, undue
influence, and fraud when doctors forcibly hospitalize and treat a patient even
when the patient does not meet commitment criteria.237 The enabling statute must
provide procedural protections to ensure that patients form Ulysses arrangements
knowingly and voluntarily and that doctors implement the arrangements in strict
accordance with patient instructions. 38
The Uniform Act Approach
The Uniform Act does not empower patients to form Ulysses arrangements
for several reasons. First, it does not allow patients to choose whether they can
revoke their directives when they lack capacity.2 39 The revocation provision
allows an individual to revoke the designation of an agent by a signed writing or
by notifying her physician.240 Individuals may revoke at any time and in any
manner that communicates intent to revoke portions of the directive that do not
designate a surrogate, such as instructions.2 41 The revocation provision does not
235 Cuca, supra note 193, at 1173.
236 Id. at 1181-85.
237 Dresser, supra note 180, at 800.
238 Cuca, supra note 193, at 1154.
239 UHCDA §§ 3, 11.
240 Id. § 3(a).
241 Id. § 3(b).
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expressly require capacity to revoke.2 42 However, the Uniform Act capacity
provision states "an individual is presumed to have capacity to make a health-
care decision, to give or revoke an advance health-care directive, and to designate
or disqualify a surrogate." 24 3 The commentary explains that this is a rebuttable
presumption.244 These provisions are subject to two different interpretations,
neither of which empowers patients to form Ulysses arrangements.
Under the first interpretation, the Uniform Act precludes patients from
forming irrevocable directives. This is because it does not expressly require
capacity to revoke and does not allow patients to designate whether their
directives are revocable during periods of incapacity.2 45 This might be why some
states that implemented the Uniform Act amended the Act's language to
expressly require capacity for revocation.246 For example, the New Mexico
statute states that "an individual while having capacity may revoke." 24 7 The New
Mexico legislature recognized that if it wanted to require capacity for revocation,
an amendment was necessary. If the Commissioners intended to require capacity
for revocation or to give patients the choice, the Uniform Act would have done
so expressly.
Comparison to state statutes that allow patients to choose supports the
conclusion that the Uniform Act does not give patients the choice. For example,
the Arizona statute states that "unless limited by the express authority in this
document, a principal even if incapable, may revoke" her mental health
directive.248 The Uniform Act does not contain such language.249 In other
instances in which the Uniform Act provides patients a choice, it does so
expressly. For example, the Uniform Act states that a directive becomes active
when the patient lacks capacity unless the patient provides otherwise.2 50 The
Uniform Act revocation provision does not contain such language. 2 5' Therefore,
pursuant to this first interpretation, the Uniform Act precludes patients from
forming irrevocable directives.
However, there is another possible interpretation. Under this second
interpretation, the Uniform Act requires capacity to revoke a directive. This
alternative interpretation relies on the Uniform Act's rebuttable presumption of
capacity to revoke the directive.25 2 Arguably, the rebuttable capacity presumption
implies that only patients with capacity may revoke. If someone is able to rebut
242 See id. § 3.
243 Id. § l1(b) (emphasis added).
244 Id.§ 11, cmt.
245 Id. §§ 3, 11.
246 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, §5-803 (2013); N.M. STAT. §24-7A-3 (2013); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§35-22-404 (2013).
247 N.M. STAT. § 24-7A-3 (emphasis added).
248 ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-3285 (2013) (emphasis added).
249 Cf UHCDA §3.
250 Id. § 2(c).
251 Cf id. § 3.
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the capacity presumption, the incapacitated patient will be prevented from
revoking her directive. Under this interpretation, at least in theory, patients may
form irrevocable directives.
Even assuming the Uniform Act requires capacity for revocation, it does not
empower patients to form Ulysses arrangements for two reasons. First, the
Commissioners did not describe how to rebut the capacity presumption.2 53 This
omission may be why some states that implemented the Uniform Act added
instructions.254 For example, Maine added the following statement: "This
presumption may be rebutted by a determination by the individual's primary
physician or by a court of competent jurisdiction."255 Without guidance like this,
it is unlikely anyone will try, much less succeed in rebutting the capacity
presumption. The patient's revocation will stand even if it was induced by an
episode. This is especially true because one purpose of the Uniform Act is to
place health care decisions in the hands of the patient, the family, and providers,
256not the courts. Rebutting the capacity presumption would likely involve court
intervention which the Commissioners sought to avoid.257 Even assuming a
Uniform Act capacity requirement for revocation, the Commissioners' failure to
provide guidance on rebutting the capacity presumption prevents patients from
forming self-binding arrangements.
Even if one interprets the Uniform Act to require capacity to revoke, the
Uniform Act does not empower people to form Ulysses arrangements for a
second reason. It provides no process for administering treatment pursuant to an
irrevocable directive in the face of patient refusals. It does not set forth clear
authority and procedural protections necessary to overcome physician reluctance
to treat in the face of illness-induced refusals and to protect patients from
coercion and abuse.
States' Approaches
A majority of all states allow the principal to revoke a generic directive at
any time, even if she has lost capacity. 2 58 However, most states with mental
health directive statutes only allow a patient with capacity to revoke a mental
253 See id.
254 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit.18-A, §5-811 (2013); N.M. STAT. §24-7A-11 (2013); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §35-22-412 (2013).
255 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 5-811.
256 See BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 814 (7th ed.
abr. 2013).
257 See supra note 254 and accompanying text; UHCDA §6 cmt. (stating that courts have no
particular expertise with respect to healthcare decision-making and court involvement causes
delays).
258 See VHA Report, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that in 36 out of 50 states, incapacitated
patients may revoke a generic directive).
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health directive.2 59
Patients should not be forced to form irrevocable directives. The majority of
states with separate mental health directive statutes reinforce the stigma of
mental illness when they do not allow patients to choose whether to make their
directives revocable during periods of incapacity. 260 The rationale for prohibiting
incapacitated patients from revoking mental health directives is that preferences
articulated in a written directive more likely reflect the authentic values of the
patient than choices made when the patient is incapacitated.26 1 The rationale is
based on the premise that restricted revocation during periods of incapacity best
serves patient autonomy because it respects a patient's choices made when she
was able to thoroughly consider the risks and benefits of treatment options.262
This premise applies equally for generic directives as it does for mental health
directives. Therefore, there is no policy reason to restrict revocation of mental
health directives if the state does not restrict revocation of generic directives, and
most states do not.263
Restricted revocation only for mental health directives undermines parity for
mental health care. In one study, almost half of surveyed patients indicated they
wanted authority to revoke their mental health directives during periods of
incapacity.264 In states that do not allow incapacitated patients to revoke their
mental health directives, patients only have the power to create self-binding
directives. 26 5 They cannot create individualized mental health care plans. One of
the Commissioners' goals was to encourage patients to form advance
directives. 266 Patients have greater autonomy if they provide advance instructions
and designate agents who understand their preferences.26 7 Patients who want the
power to revoke their mental health directives when they lack capacity may
refrain from advance planning if their only option is to form an irrevocable
directive.
Typical mental health directive statutes do not empower patients to form
Ulysses arrangements because they fail to set forth a process for administering
treatment in the face of illness-induced refusals. 268 The typical statute merely
requires capacity for revocation and provides immunity to physicians who follow
259 Id. (noting that 18 out of 25 states with mental health directive statutes only allow
revocation from patients with capacity).
260 See id. at 9; Cuca, supra note 193, at 1162-63; Gallagher, supra note 6, at 778; Srebnik et
al., supra note 150, at 592.
261 VHA Report, supra note 10, at 9; Cuca, supra note 193, at 1162-63.
262 VHA Report, supra note 10, at 9.
263 Gallagher, supra note 6, at 778; VHA Report, supra note 10, at 9.
264 Srebnik et al., supra note 150, at 592.
265 See Dresser, supra note 180, at 781; Sabatino, supra note 2.
266 Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1238-39.
267 Id. at 1239.
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the directive. 269 This is insufficient to enable physicians to forcibly hospitalize
and treat patients who do not meet commitment criteria. Physicians will be
legitimately fearful of liability for administering involuntary treatment. A clear
process with safeguards against abuse helps address concerns that family and
providers will coerce patients into forming Ulysses arrangements that they will
use to force treatment on the patient. Patients should only enter Ulysses
arrangements voluntarily and knowingly. Therefore, such arrangements are not
appropriate for patients deprived of the right to choose whether they can revoke
their directives when they lack capacity.
Washington's Approach
Washington has a unique approach that provides instructions on
implementation of an irrevocable directive. When a principal's mental health
directive remains irrevocable during incapacity and consents to inpatient mental
health treatment, but the principal refuses admission, the facility may admit the
patient despite illness-induced refusals. 270 There are strict criteria for such
admission. 271 First, one doctor in conjunction with another 272 must determine
whether the principal lacks capacity. The Washington statute does not address
whether a principal's refusal of admission in contravention of express
instructions in her directive supports a determination of incapacity.273 This is a
failure because many mental illnesses can induce people to refuse admission and
treatment.274 The directive provides clear evidence that the patient, when she had
capacity, requested admission and treatment. Second, the doctor must obtain the
informed consent of the principal's agent if one is designated.275 Third, after
evaluation, the doctor must determine and make a written finding that the
principal needs inpatient evaluation or treatment that cannot be accomplished in a
less restrictive setting.276 Fourth, the doctor must document in the patient's
medical record a summary of findings and recommendations.27 7
If the doctor determines the principal has capacity, the principal may only be
269 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 327G-4 (2013) (merely stating that capacity is required to
revoke); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 43/5 (2013); Sheetz, supra note 9, at 431 (Many statutes grant
immunity for providers who make good faith efforts to comply with directives.).
270 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.32.140 (2013).
271 Id. § 71.32.140(2).
272 Id. § 71.32.140(2)(a)-(3). The statute requires a physician or psychiatric registered nurse
practitioner, in conjunction with another health care provider, to make the incapacity determination.
If the admitting clinician is not a psychiatrist/psychiatric advanced registered nurse practitioner, a
mental health professional shall assess the principal within 24 hours to determine continued need
for inpatient evaluation or treatment.
273 Id. § 71.32.140.
274 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
275 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.32.140(2)(b).
276 Id. § 71.32.140(2)(c).
277 Id. § 71.32.140(2)(d).
31
31
Clausen: Making the Case for a Model Mental Health Advance Directive Statu
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
admitted or remain in inpatient treatment if the principal consents or is detained
under involuntary commitment law. 27 8 If two doctors determine that the principal
lacks capacity and the principal continues to refuse admission, the principal may
seek injunctive relief.279 The facility may retain the patient for up to 14 days, and
only for the amount of time that she consented to inpatient treatment in her
directive. At that point, the facility must discharge the patient unless she regains
capacity and consents to further treatment or is detained under involuntary
commitment law. 28 0
The incapacitated principal's instructions in her directive control her
treatment with one significant exception.281 Even if the principal's irrevocable
directive consents to inpatient treatment despite illness-induced refusals, the
facility shall discharge the principal if she "takes actions demonstrating a desire
to be discharged, in addition to making statements requesting to be
discharged." 28 2 The facility shall not use restraint in any way to prevent
discharge. 283 This limitation essentially prevents patients from entering Ulysses
arrangements. 2 84
Even the Washington approach, noted for its progressive support of patient
empowerment,285 falls short of authorizing Ulysses arrangements. First, it
requires a facility to discharge an incapacitated patient who takes action and
makes statements demonstrating the desire to be discharged, even if discharge
contravenes the patient's irrevocable directive.286 The following illustrates why
this prevents Ulysses arrangements.
A patient executes an irrevocable directive consenting to inpatient treatment
that becomes active pursuant to its terms. His daughter drives him to a hospital
where he refuses admission. The admitting psychiatrist follows the Washington
protocol and determines that the patient lacks capacity and needs the inpatient
treatment his directive describes. 28 7 The mentally ill patient does not recognize
that he is ill. He demands discharge through words and actions. Psychiatrists
determine that although the patient lacks capacity, he fails to meet involuntary
commitment criteria. Left untreated, his mental illness will likely escalate to
278 Id. § 71.32.140(4)(a).
279 Id. § 71.32.140(4)(d).
280 Id. § 71.32.140(5).
281 Id. § 71.32.140(6)(b).
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 See id. (providing that because this is a voluntary admission, a patient who takes action to
leave and demands discharge must be discharged unless she meets involuntary commitment criteria
but failing to explain why the patient's illness-induced demands override her consent in her
directive).
285 See Sheetz, supra note 9, at 401 (stating that Washington authorizes Ulysses directives
and advocating for other states to adopt similar provisions).
286 WASH REV. CODE § 71.32.140(6)(b).




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 14 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol14/iss1/1
CASE FOR A MODEL MENTAL HEALTH DIRECTIVE STATUTE
psychosis. 288 Despite this inevitability, Washington requires discharge.2 89
Second, Washington fails to assist doctors in their assessment of patient
capacity when a principal's illness-induced refusals contradict the patient's
directive.2 9 0 When a principal arrives at a facility but refuses admission because
of an episode, Washington requires a capacity assessment.29 1 If doctors determine
the principal lacks capacity, they may admit the principal only if they follow
strict protocols.292 If the principal has capacity, doctors must discharge the
principal unless the principal consents to inpatient treatment.293 The Washington
statute fails to recognize that a person who refuses care requested in her
irrevocable directive necessarily exhibits substantial evidence of incapacity.
A person cannot have capacity if he does not understand the significant
benefits of proposed treatment. Acute episodes can destroy insight and cause
patients to refuse intervention. 294 When a patient's irrevocable directive consents
to treatment that the patient refuses when he arrives at the hospital, the refusal
itself is evidence of incapacity. In this way, the Washington statute ignores
several factors that make doctors reluctant to admit patients whose illnesses
cause them to refuse treatment. First, only a small percentage of patients with
mental illness execute mental health directives. 295 Therefore, most psychiatrists
have little experience implementing directives generally, much less Ulysses
arrangements. Second, psychiatrists are very familiar with the strict criteria for
involuntary admission and treatment. Unless Washington instructs otherwise,
doctors will likely automatically apply this strict criteria. Third, because capacity
is fluid, capacity determinations are not black and white decisions. When in
doubt, doctors will likely err on the side of caution and discharge patients whose
illnesses cause treatment refusals regardless of consent to treatment in an
irrevocable directive.2 96 This caution prevents necessary intervention. Honoring a
patient's consent to early intervention in an irrevocable directive not only
respects patient autonomy, it could potentially save the patient's life.
288 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
289 WASH REV. CODE § 71.32.140(6)(b).
290 Id. § 71.32.140; see also id. § 71.32.110.
291 Id. § 71.32.140(2).
292 Id.
293 Id. § 71.32.140(4)(a).
294 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
295 See Maria J. O'Connell & Catherine H. Stein, Psychiatric Advance Directives:
Perspectives of Community Stakeholders, 32 ADMIN. & POL'Y MENTAL HEALTH 241, 244 (2005)
(Only 6.8% of people with schizophrenia surveyed had a mental health directive.); Jeffrey Swanson
et al., Psychiatric Advance Directives Among Public Mental Health Consumers in Five U.S. Cities:
Prevalence, Demand, and Correlates, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 43, 54 (2006) (finding
that between 4 and 13% of mental health patients surveyed had directives).
296 See supra notes 107-113 and accompanying text.
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C. Execution
The Uniform Act's Minimal Execution Requirements
Under the Uniform Act, an "individual instruction" is the principal's
directions about her health care.297 Oral instructions are valid.298 The patient's
physician need only record the oral instructions in the principal's medical
record.29 9 A patient may issue written instructions without any witnesses,
notarization, or mandatory form or language.30 0
The Uniform Act permits three types of proxies to make health care
decisions for patients who lack capacity: surrogates, guardians, and agents. 30 1 A
principal's designation of an agent (a power of attorney for health care) must be
in a signed writing.302 The only people who may not be agents are owners,
operators, or employees of residential long-term health care institutions where
the principal receives care, unless they are related to the principal.303 Designation
of an agent need not be witnessed or notarized.30 A surrogate is an individual
authorized to make the principal's health care decisions when the principal lacks
capacity, and no agent or guardian has been designated or is available. 3 05 A
patient may select a surrogate orally by personally informing her doctor.306
A comparison with state advance directive statutes is useful to illustrate that
many legislatures consider execution requirements to be useful protections
against abuse. Every state that implemented the Uniform Act imposed witnessing
requirements for all directives, presumably to protect against fraud and
coercion.307 The need to protect against coercion in the context of mental health
directives is arguably greater than the need for generic directives. Scholars and
legislatures have recognized the potential risk of family and doctors using mental
308health directives as instruments to coerce patients to accept certain treatments.
Patients with mental illness are especially vulnerable to coercion because they
may perceive the threat of involuntary commitment or forced administration of
297 UHCDA § 1(9).
298 Id. § 2(a).
299 Id. § 7(b); Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1243.
300 UHCDA § 2.
301 Id. § 1; see Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1242.
302 UHCDA § 2(b).
303 Id. § 2(b) & cmt.
304 Id.
305 Id. § 5(a).
306 Id. § 5(b).
307 Charles P. Sabatino, The Evolution ofHealth Care Advance Planning Law and Policy, 88
MILBANK Q. 211, 217 (2010).
308 Dunlap, supra note 14, at 378 (noting that states enacted penalties against people who
coerce a patient into or out of executing a mental health directive); Lester J. Perling, Health Care
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medication.3 09 The potential for undue influence may be why almost all states
with separate mental health directive statutes have included restrictions on who
may serve as a witness. 310 Several states prohibit members of a principal's family
and treatment team members from serving as witnesses.3 1 Typically, witnesses
must attest to certain observations such as that the principal executed the
directive voluntarily. 3 12
State statute approaches underscore the fact that protections against abuse are
necessary. The Uniform Act's minimal execution requirements expose mental
health patients to risks of undue influence, fraud, and coercion. Because the
Uniform Act does not allow for Ulysses arrangements, this section criticizes the
Uniform Act's minimal execution requirements for any mental health directive.
Ensuring that there are robust protections against abuse is even more critical in
the context of Ulysses arrangements. This is because there is a danger that family
and providers will coerce the patient into forming a Ulysses arrangement and
then use the arrangement as a tool to intimidate the patient to comply with a
313
treatment regimen.
Elimination of Witnessing Requirements Poses Undue Risks
The Uniform Law Commissioners' elimination of a witness requirement
removes an important protection against undue influence, coercion, and fraud.3 14
Witness attestation that the principal showed identification or that the witness
knew the principal and had no reason to suspect the principal executed the
directive under undue influence or fraud helps ensure execution was voluntary.
Moreover, the Commissioners should remove from the potential witness pool
people who may have conflicts of interest. Allowing family and treatment team
members, who often hold strong opinions about optimum treatments, to witness
the directive presents unnecessary risks of coercion and undue influence.3 1 5
Agents should not serve as witnesses because they have the authority to make all
309 Bruce J. Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9
PSYCH. PUB. & L. 107 (2003).
310 VHA Report, supra note 10, at 5 (stating that concerns over coercion and undue influence
caused all of the states with separate statutes except Montana to restrict who may serve as
witnesses).
311 Id. (listing Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and
Washington as excluding family members and all of the previously listed states in addition to
Wyoming as excluding treatment team members).
312 Id. (stating most mental health directive statutes require witness attestation except Indiana,
Maine, Maryland, Montana, and Washington).
313 Id.
314 Stith, supra note 2, at 47-48 ("The streamlined procedures appear to sacrifice safeguards
for efficiency.").
315 VHA Report, supra note 10, at 5-6.
35
35
Clausen: Making the Case for a Model Mental Health Advance Directive Statu
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
health care decisions when the principal lacks capacity.316 Furthermore, agents
should not witness the same instrument that gives them this power. 3 17 People
affiliated with health care facilities in which the principal receives treatment
should not serve as witnesses because they have financial interests in
administering care.
Elimination of the Signed Writing Requirement Removes Safeguards
The Uniform Act has been commended for permitting patients to orally
designate surrogates and issue treatment instructions because this flexibility is
practical and removes obstacles to advance health care planning. 3 1 Most people
do not create written directives, possibly because they do not like to think about
death. When patients do issue instructions, they tend to do o informally. 3 19 The
typical patient may say, "If I lose capacity, my daughter should make decisions
concerning my care." 320 The Uniform Act enforces oral instructions and
designations of surrogates for this reason.32 '
This is why the Uniform Act's elimination of the signed writing requirement
is another example of its focus on end-of-life circumstances, not episodic mental
illness. For patients with mental illness, the risks posed by enforcing oral
instructions and designations of surrogates do not justify the purported benefits.
This is because oral instructions are less portable, more susceptible to fraud, and
make physicians vulnerable to false accusations. Moreover, requiring a signed
writing better ensures the patient has capacity when he forms a directive.
First, people with mental illness need portable instructions and designations
of agents. Oral instructions are not as readily portable as a written directive. 3 22
Patients often receive treatment for acute episodes in emergency rooms or in
prison health clinics. 32 3 Mental illness patients benefit from portable directives
that can be followed wherever they receive treatment.
Second, oral instructions are less reliable and more susceptible to
misinterpretation and fraud than written directives. Because mental illnesses are
complicated,324 patient instructions in such cases are often nuanced. If a patient
makes off-the-cuff remarks under the stress of an impending crisis, the Uniform
Act grants the physician, who has financial interests in administering care and
strong opinions about optimal treatments, the authority to record and therefore
316 UHCDA § 1(2).
317 Id.
318 See Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1244-45.
319 FURROW, supra note 100, at 849 (stating that only 10-25% of Americans have
documented end-of-life choices or appointed an agent).
320 Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1244-45.
321 Id.
322 Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1243.
323 See supra note 29.
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interpret these inherently unreliable oral remarks.32 5 Enforcing oral instructions
risks misinterpretation of patient wishes. Moreover, it creates opportunities for
health care fraud. Mental health care is particularly susceptible to fraud because:
(1) strict patient confidentiality makes abuse hard to discover; (2) the practice of
mental health medicine is highly subjective; and (3) mental health patients are
often less able to chronicle their treatment than other patients.326 Therefore, in the
mental health sector, enforcing oral instructions recorded by the patient's
physician increases opportunities for fraud and abuse. 3 27
Third, a signed writing requirement protects doctors from fraudulent claims
that they administered treatment without informed consent. The written, signed
directive documents informed consent to all treatment administered pursuant to
its terms. A physician's notes recording a patient's oral remarks may not provide
sufficient evidence of informed consent if the patient claims she never consented.
Finally, determining the precise moment an episode causes a person to lose
capacity required to issue binding oral instructions is difficult. There is a concern,
for example, that a patient with bipolar disorder will utter oral instructions to his
doctor when he is hypomanic but technically has capacity. During some episodes
of mental illness, patients refuse treatment even though they would have
requested treatment if they were not altered by an episode.328 Moreover, acute
episodes may alter a person's judgment in other ways. A bipolar patient when
hypomanic may associate with people with whom he would not associate when
he was well and ask one of these strangers to be his surrogate. Requiring a
written directive better ensures that patients have full capacity when they issue
instructions or designate an agent.
The Capacity Presumption and Definition
The Uniform Act defines capacity as an individual's ability to understand the
significant benefits, risks, and alternatives to proposed health care and to make
and communicate health care decisions. 3 29 There is a rebuttable presumption of
capacity.330 No clinician determination of capacity is necessary to create a
directive.33 1 The Uniform Act's definition of capacity is similar to the definition
of capacity used in many mental health directive statutes.332 Most states' statutes,
like the Uniform Act, have a statutory presumption of capacity to execute any
325 UHCDA § 7(b).
326 See Pamela H. Bucy, Health Care Fraud and the False Claims Act, ABA CTR.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. NAT'L INST., Nov. 19-20, 1998, at *9 (1998), available at N98CFCB
ABA-LGLED E-I (Westlaw); Rosenfeld, supra note 114, at 77.
327 Id.
328 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
329 UHCDA § 1(3).
330 Id. § 11(b).
331 Id.
332 See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 327G-2, -5 (2013).
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directive, including a mental health directive. However, in Louisiana, an
individual wishing to create a mental health directive, but not a generic directive,
must obtain a clinician's written attestation that she examined the principal and
determined the principal had capacity.334
Requiring a physician attestation of patient capacity to form any mental
health directive335 stigmatizes people with mental illness and creates an
unnecessary administrative obstacle to advance planning. When free from the
influence of an episode, many people with mental illness are no less able to make
rational treatment choices than people who do not have a mental illness. 336 This is
why the Commissioners' decision to use the same definition of capacity for the
physical and the mental health contexts makes sense.337 Moreover, unlike
Louisiana, the Commissioners wisely decided to presume that all patients have
capacity to form a directive. That presumption is appropriately rebuttable
because some patients lack capacity.
However, there are compelling reasons to require a capacity determination at
the time a patient forms a Ulysses arrangement. Ulysses arrangements are
instruments of self-paternalism. 338 They respect patient autonomy by
empowering the patient to direct her health care even during episodes that
destroy capacity.339 It is essential that the patient has capacity when she forms a
Ulysses arrangement. Critics worry that because mental illness often negatively
affects loved ones, family may be prone to coerce the patient into forming the
arrangement. 340 A physician's attestation of the principal's capacity at the time of
execution is necessary to ensure self-binding treatment is what the patient really
wants.
D. Activation
To choose the best activation standard, it is necessary to identify the
available options: (1) legal incompetence (used for guardianship proceedings),
(2) decision-making capacity (used for informed consent),34 1 (3) dangerousness
or severe disability (used for involuntary commitment), or (4) patient-designated
342activation.
333 Winick, supra note 95, at 68 n.39; Sheetz, supra note 9, at 413.
334 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:224 (2013); Sheetz, supra note 9, at 414.
335 See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
336 Sheetz, supra note 9, at 405.
337 UHCDA §1(3).
338 See Dresser, supra note 180, at 851.
339 See Willigenburg and Belaere, supra note 8, at 395-96.
340 See Winick, supra note 95, at 87.
341 See, e.g., UHCDA § 1(3).
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Courts determine legal incompetence, but physicians determine incapacity. 34 3
A legal incompetence activation standard does not empower patients to prevent
damage caused by mental illness for two reasons. First, a legal incompetence
activation standard vests judges with the authority to determine when the
directive becomes active even though judges have no specialized training in
mental illness or in evaluating a patient's mental state. 34 Second, the legal
incompetence activation standard obstructs the patient's ability to obtain care. If
a court determination is required before a directive becomes active, many
patients will not be able to obtain intervention in time. Because physicians, not
courts, determine capacity, selecting incapacity as the default activation standard
when patients fail to designate one better serves patients.345
An involuntary commitment activation standard is even more problematic for
patients attempting to obtain early intervention than an incompetence standard
because a person cannot be committed involuntarily unless he is dangerous or
gravely disabled a very high threshold.346  This strict standard delays
intervention.347 Capacity is an appropriate default standard for a Ulysses
arrangement because the arrangement's purpose is to obtain early intervention
and avoid commitment. For directives which refuse treatment, early activation
ensures that doctors follow patient wishes despite the fact that an episode may
obstruct the patient's ability to express refusals.
Admittedly the incapacity activation standard has its drawbacks. First,
capacity is often fluid and difficult to determine for patients with mental
illness.348 Second, a physician capacity determination takes time. However, the
delays are not nearly as long as those caused by court hearings and rulings.
One of the only strengths of the Uniform Act in the mental health context is
its decision to allow patients to determine the triggers that allow their directives
to take effect. This decision facilitates early intervention even more than an
incapacity activation standard. If the patient does not designate a different
circumstance, the power of attorney for health care becomes effective when the
primary physician determines the patient has lost capacity. 349 The Uniform Act
commentary uses the following example to illustrate patient designated
activation.350 A mother may not want to continue to make her own health care
343 Sheetz, supra note 9, at 415; Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence:
Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV.
345, 345-49 (1996).
344 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 210, 231-32 (1990) (concluding that a person's
interests are better served by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by a medical
professional rather than an untrained judge); Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1245 (asserting that the
Commissioners wanted to keep most health care decisions out of court).
345 See Sheetz, supra note 9, at 401.
346 See supra Part I.B.
347 Id
348 See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
349 UHCDA § 2(c).
350 Id. §2(c) cmt.
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decisions and may prefer that her daughter make them for her. This mother may
specify that her daughter should immediately have power of attorney, even
before the mother becomes incapacitated. The mother retains the right to revoke
the power of attorney at any time if she does so in writing.
Unlike the Uniform Act, the majority of states with separate mental health
directive statutes do not allow directives to become active until the patient has
lost capacity.35 ' However, like the Uniform Act, some states empower a person to
create a mental health directive which takes effect before loss of capacity.352
Although the Commissioners adopted the standard that best empowers
patients, patient designated activation, the Commissioners should provide more
guidance on patient designated activation in the mental health context. Scholars
contend activation before loss of capacity is important in the mental health
context because early activation enables patients to prevent crisis. 35 3
The following is an example of a patient-designated activation clause:
My bipolar disorder follows a pattern. Normally, I take my
medication and remain stable. However, stress can make me lose sleep,
which causes me to become hypomanic. When I am hypomanic, I no
longer recognize my need for treatment and stop my medication. While
I'm hypomanic, it is possible that my physician may determine I still
technically possess capacity. Left untreated, my condition will
deteriorate until I become psychotic.
This directive shall become active when my daughter and brother
execute a signed affidavit, listing observed symptoms and attesting that
they have concluded that I have become hypomanic. I have decided not
to require a court determination of my incompetence or a physician's
determination of my incapacity to activate this directive because such a
requirement would delay treatment.
This patient recognizes that if he chooses incapacity, as determined by his
psychiatrist as the activation standard, all of the following will have to take place
before treatment. Someone will have to transport the patient to his psychiatrist.
He will resist. Someone will have to make an appointment with his psychiatrist.
Even if he obtains an appointment, when the patient is hypomanic, he will not
351 VHA Report, supra note 10, at 8 (stating that in the 19 states with separate statutes,
directives don't become active until the patient loses capacity).
352 ME. REV. STAT. TIT. 18-A, § 5-802 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-108 (WEST 2013);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7B-4 (2013); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5824 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 71.32.060 (2013); see also VHA Report, supra note 10, at 8 (asserting that the states
previously listed allow for activation before incapacity).
353 Janet Ritchie et al., Advance Directives in Psychiatry: Resolving Issues of Autonomy and
Competence, 21 INT'L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 245 (1998); Gary N. Sales, The Health Care Proxy for
Mental Illness: Can It Work and Should We Want It To? 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
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want treatment. He will try to convince his psychiatrist of his capacity. The
psychiatrist may not be accustomed to working with directives35 4 and will be
reluctant to hospitalize the patient pursuant to the directive. Instead, the patient
has listed two people he trusts and has required them to sign an affidavit attesting
to their observations. For him, this strikes the right balance between protection
against undue influence and obtaining early intervention. The patient should be
free to make this choice.
This activation clause is considered an early activation clause because it
activates the directive before a physician has determined he has lost capacity.
Critics argue early activation is problematic because it creates potential for
coercion, which in this instance is brought on by the power vested in family
members to activate the directive. However, every patient should be free to create
an individualized plan.356 This freedom results in a lack of standardization of
directives. Therefore, the patient, his physician, and the trusted family members
will need to be sure of what the plan entails. A patient concerned about family
having too much control can rely on the presumptive activation standard of a
physician determination of incapacity. 357 The Uniform Act, which authorizes
patient designated activation, clarifies that a patient with capacity may override
her directive or the instructions of her agent. This is another protection against
358coercion.
E. Expiration
The Commissioners did not provide for automatic expiration of directives.
Rather, directives expire under their own terms or when principals revoke them.
However, many state mental health directive statutes 359 provide for automatic
directive expiration after a specified time frame, usually somewhere between two
and five years. No state legislature imposes this arbitrary expiration 360 on generic
directives.
Advocates of automatic expiration assert the following rationale. First, as
technology evolves, treatment options change. 36 1 A patient's mental illness
evolves over the course of the patient's life. Automatic expiration of mental
health directives ensures directives continue to reflect patients' treatment
instructions over time as their illnesses and treatment options evolve. Second,
automatic expiration requires patients to engage in ongoing dialogue with doctors
354 See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
355 VHA Report, supra note 10, at 8.
356 Sheetz, supra note 9, at 403.
357 UHCDA § 2(c)-(d) & cmt.
358 VHA Report, supra note 10, at 4.
359 See VHA Report, supra note 10, at 10; see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2135.03 (West
2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.702 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-1003 (2013); TEX. CiV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13 7.002(b) (West 2013).
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and periodically reassess treatment instructions.3 62 This therapeutic process
results in improved decision-making.
Despite these purported benefits, automatic expiration of mental health
directives imposes a burden only on patients with mental illness. This burden is
unjustified, impractical, and unfair.3 63 First, imposing automatic expiration only
on mental health directives unjustifiably treats patients with mental illness
differently than other patients. The alleged policy reasons supporting automatic
expiration of mental health directives apply equally to generic directives.
Technology constantly evolves for end-of-life treatment just as it does for mental
health treatment. Patients planning for end-of-life care would also benefit from
ongoing dialogue with their physicians. 3 64 Just as treatment preferences and goals
evolve over time for patients with mental illness, preferences change for the
terminally ill.
Second, automatic expiration poses significant administrative burdens only
on patients with mental illness who are forced to track the age of directives and
re-execute directives every couple of years. 36 5 Few patients execute mental health
directives. 36 6 It is likely that even fewer patients would monitor the age of their
mental health directives.
Third, requiring automatic expiration only for mental health directives
stigmatizes patients with mental illness and undermines parity for mental health
care. 36 7 The National Ethics Committee of the Veterans Health Administration
indicated that it knew of no evidence supporting the proposition that instructions
in a mental health directive "are less stable" than patient instructions in a generic
directive.368
However, the automatic expiration administrative burden is necessary only
for Ulysses arrangements, not revocable mental health directives, for the
following reasons. First, automatic expiration helps address concerns about
unanticipated consequences due to a patient's change of heart or failure to
foresee all contingencies. Automatic expiration after a few years would require
the patient to reaffirm her decision to have a Ulysses arrangement. Reaffirmation
would help ensure that the patient continues to want physicians to override her
illness-induced refusals of treatment.
Second, automatic expiration only of Ulysses arrangements helps address
concerns critics raise that consent provided in a Ulysses arrangement is not valid
informed consent because it is not contemporaneous. These critics argue that





366 See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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contemporaneous objections, the doctors rely on expired consent.3 69 Automatic
expiration does not guarantee that consent is happening at the moment of
treatment, but it does help ensure that the patient has given consent to her
directive relatively recently. This is because automatic expiration requires the
patient to reaffirm the directive every couple of years.370
F. Advance Consent to Intrusive Treatments, the Role ofProxies, and Patients
Who Fail to Plan
This section describes mental health treatments a person might address in a
directive. It explores how the Uniform Act addresses advance consent to
intrusive treatments, the selection and authority of proxies, and situations when a
patient fails to plan. Next, it surveys state approaches to selection of proxies and
advance consent to intrusive treatments. Finally, this section evaluates the
Uniform Act approach to conclude that it poses undue risks to patients.
Mental Health Treatments
A basic understanding of mental health treatments is necessary to evaluate
whether the Uniform Act provides sufficient guidance on advance consent to
such treatments. Doctors did not use psychiatric (also known as psychotropic)
drugs to treat mental illness until the late 1940s after the discovery that lithium
effectively treated bipolar disorder.371' Antipsychotic medications are a class of
psychiatric medications doctors began using to treat psychosis in the 1950s. 372 I
the beginning, antipsychotic medications proved effective in limiting
psychosis. 7 Censuses in state psychiatric hospitals dropped in the years
following the widespread use of antipsychotic drugs.3 74 It soon became obvious
that while antipsychotic medication minimized psychosis, it also potentially
caused serious side effects.37s Because of the side effects of various psychiatric
medications, courts and legislators consider psychiatric medication to be an
intrusive treatment.3 76 In the 1990s, the United States Food and Drug
Administration approved some new antipsychotic drugs for treating patients with
369 See supra notes 187-189 and accompanying text.
370 See e.g., OH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 2135.03 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-1003(a)
(2013); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 137.002(b) (West 2013).
371 See SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 23.
372 Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket ": The Legal Significance of
Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1033
(2002).
373 Perlin, supra note 54, at 400.
374 Id. at 398.
375 Id.
376 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
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psychotic disorders.377 Although these medications are not always effective and
do not cure the illness, they are possibly more effective than the older
antipsychotic medications. 37 8 The new drugs are "atypical" because they are
different than the older antipsychotic medications in that they alleviate psychotic
symptoms with fewer side effects.379
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), generally considered to be a more
invasive treatment than drug therapy, 380 directs electric currents to parts of the
brain, which induces a series of seizures. ' There is not yet a scientific consensus
on the explanation for the purported therapeutic benefits of ECT.3 82 Historically,
patient advocates criticized ECT because of its side effects, such as memory loss,
dental trauma, bone fractures, and skin bums.3 8 3 Today, improved technology for
administering ECT combined and improvements in muscle relaxants have
resolved many of the side effects.384 However, certain side effects remain,
including memory loss, which can result in permanent memory gaps. 3 85 Although
the modem psychiatric community recognizes ECT as an effective and safe
treatment for patients who suffer from severe depression and a viable alternative
for patients unable to take medication or for whom medication is ineffective, the
community is not in unanimous agreement with critics saying that ECT is
ineffective and can damage the brain.3 8 6
The California legislature defines psychosurgery as including operations
referred to as lobotomy, psychiatric surgery, behavioral surgery,387 or any surgery
performed to modify or control thoughts, feelings, or behavior, rather than treat a
known, diagnosed physical disease of the brain.38 8 Doctors used prefrontal
lobotomy for decades to treat depression, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, and schizophrenia. 38 9 Today, the medical community considers
prefrontal lobotomy to be a discredited, dangerous treatment whose benefits are
377 Mossman, supra note 372, at 1039 (The new drugs are clozapine, risperidone, olanzapine,
quetiapine, and ziprasidone.).
378 Id.
379 Id, at 1039-40.
380 See infra note 427 and accompanying text.
381 Mike E. Jorgensen, Is Today the Day We Free Electroconvulsive Therapy?, 12
QUINNIPIAc HEALTH L.J. 1, 3-4 (2008).
382 Helia Garrido Hull, Electroconvulsive Therapy: Baby Boomers May Be in for the Shock of
Their Lives, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 241, 251 (2008).
383 Jorgensen, supra note 381, at 10.
384 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 27.
385 Hull, supra note 382, at 254-56; In re Estate of Austwick, 656 N.E.2d 779, 781 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995) (listing fractures, memory loss, confusion, delirium, and in rare instances, death as side
effects).
386 Hull, supra note 382, at 251, 259.
387 See CAL. CODE WELF. & INST. § 5325 (West 2013).
388 Id.
389 Henry T. Greeley, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment,
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outweighed by the significant risks of permanent brain damage.3 90 Modem
psychosurgery techniques are referred to as stereotactic procedures and involve
creating small lesions in different areas of the brain.3 9' Generally, even these
modem procedures are rarely used and considered highly intrusive.392 When
performed, the procedures are typically restricted to hospitalized patients with
very serious mental disorders only after less intrusive therapies have failed.39
The Uniform Act Approach
Health care decisions of the guardian, agent, or surrogate are effective
without judicial approval.3 94 If neither the patient nor the court has designated a
proxy, or the proxy is unavailable, any available family member may act as
surrogate under a priority system starting with the spouse. 395 The surrogate must
promptly inform the other family members of her assumption of authority. 3 96
Unless the person is related to the patient, an owner, operator, or employee of a
residential long-term health care institution at which the patient receives care
may not act as a surrogate or agent.397 The patient may disqualify a person from
acting as her surrogate by a signed writing or by informing her doctor. 98 The
Uniform Act imposes no other safeguards against the nomination of proxies who
might depart from patient wishes.399
If members of a class of surrogates who have equal priority (i.e. siblings)
disagree about a treatment decision, majority rule applies.400 If these surrogates
are still evenly divided, the decision-making process stops 4 0 1 and a court-
appointed guardian makes the decision.402 Agents and surrogates must make
decisions in accordance with the patient's instructions or known wishes. 4 03 if
there are no instructions, agents and surrogates shall make decisions pursuant to
the patient's best interests while considering the patient's values.404
A patient can consent to mental health treatment in a directive by issuing
instructions and/or designating a proxy, thereby avoiding the time consuming
390 Id.
391 Id.
392 SLOBOGIN ET AL., supra note 47, at 32.
393 Id.; 1 KAPLAN & SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1914 (Benjamin
J. Sadock et al., eds., 9th ed. 2009).
394 UHCDA §§ 2(f), 5(g), 6(c); see also id § 6(b).
395 Id. § 5(b).
396 Id. § 5(d).
397 Id. § 5(i).
398 Id. § 5(h).
399 See Stith, supra note 2, at 58.
400 UHCDA § 5(e) & cmt.
401 Id.
402 Id. §§ 5(e) & cmt., 14; see Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1249.
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process of resorting to a court-appointed proxy.40 5 Whether a patient can grant a
surrogate or agent the authority to consent to inpatient mental health treatment
has been the subject of debate and was the impetus for the 1999 amendment to
406the Uniform Act. As amended, the Uniform Act now prohibits agents and
surrogates from consenting to the patient's inpatient mental health treatment
unless the written directive expressly provides such authority.407
Despite the requirement for express written authorization for an agent or
surrogate to consent to inpatient mental health treatment, the Uniform Act does
not seem to require express written authorization for an agent or surrogate to
consent to outpatient ECT or psychotropic medication.40 8 This is because the
Uniform Act's broad grant of authority to agents and surrogates includes the
authority to make all health care decisions for the patient. 40 9 Health care
decisions include selection and discharge of doctors, approval and disapproval of
tests, surgeries, medications, and orders to resuscitate, and directions to provide,
withhold, or withdraw artificial nutrition, hydration, and other care. 4 10 This
definition appears broad enough to encompass ECT, psychotropic medication,
and even psychosurgery. However, the Uniform Act and its commentary do not
explicitly mention ECT, psychotropic medication, or psychosurgery. Rather, the
enumerated examples of health care decisions focus on end-of-life decisions.
Under the Uniform Act, clinicians and institutions have the duty to comply
with a patient's instructions as well as a proxy's decisions.4 1 Decisions of agents,
surrogates, and guardians obligate the clinician or institution to the same extent
as the patient's instructions.412 Override provisions delineate limited instances in
which the physician need not follow the directive. 413 First, clinicians and
institutions may refuse to implement instructions or a proxy's decisions for
reasons of conscience.4 14 Second, clinicians and institutions may refuse to
implement instructions or a proxy's decisions requiring medically ineffective
care or treatment contrary to accepted standards.4 15 When the clinician or
institution refuses to treat in accordance with the instruction or proxy decision,
405 Id. § 2.
406 Cohen v. Bolduc, 760 N.E.2d 714, 613, 614 nn.13 & 14 (Mass. 2002); see also Winick,
supra note 95, at 81-86.
407 UHCDA § 13(e) (clarifying that UJHCDA does not address whether a guardian has
authority to consent to the principal's inpatient mental health treatment but leaving that matter to
state guardianship law); see also id. § 13(f) (stating that UHCDA does not affect mental health
treatment of involuntarily committed people because state law addresses this matter).
408 Id. §§ 1(2), 1(6). 1(17), 2, 5.
409 Id. §§ 1(6), 2(b), 5(a).
410 Id.§ 1(6).
411 Id. § 7(d).
412 Id.
413 Id. § 7(e)-(f); see VHA Report, supra note 10, at 6.
414 UHCDA § 7(e).
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they must notify the patient or her authorized representative.4 16 Moreover, they
must make reasonable efforts to assist in transferring the patient to another
facility willing to comply with the directive and provide continuing care until
transfer.417
State Approaches
Most states provide broader protection against health care fraud than the
Uniform Act does, by removing people affiliated with any facility treating the
418patient. Some states that have implemented the Uniform Act have amended the
Uniform Act's automatic surrogate selection priority system to safeguard against
selecting a surrogate who might depart from patient values.4 19 For example,
Delaware disqualifies a spouse when there has been a complaint of domestic
abuse. 42 0 Hawaii refused to enact the prionity list and selects surrogates based on
consensus of interested parties.4 2 1
Whether a principal can convey authority to an agent to consent to the
principal's admission in a mental health facility depends on the principal's state
of residence. Some states authorize patients to create mental health directives but
do not allow patients to empower an agent to consent to inpatient mental health
treatment.422 In North Dakota, patients are allowed to convey an agent authority
to consent to voluntary commitment of the patient for up to 45 days but are not
allowed to consent to a commitment for any greater length of time.423 Other states
follow the Uniform Act approach by allowing an agent to consent to the
principal's inpatient treatment only with express authority in a written
directive.424 Finally, some states allow an agent to consent to the principal's
inpatient mental health treatment even without express commitment authority as
long as the grant of authority is sufficiently broad.425
Whether a patient may use a directive to consent to intrusive treatments also
depends on the principal's state of residence. Many states prohibit patients from
consenting to or conveying authority to an agent to consent to psychosurgery in a
416 Id. § 7.
417 Id.
418 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.010(c) (2013); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4659(a)-(b) (2013).
419 Stith, supra note 2, at 58.
420 DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 16, § 2507(b)(2)(f) (2013).
421 Stith, supra note 2, at 58.
422 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.152(f)(1) (West 2013); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 155.20(2) (West Supp. 2013); Cohen v. Bolduc, 760 N.E.2d 714, 714, 718 n.15 (Mass.
2002).
423 N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06-5-03 (2013); Cohen, 760 N.E.2d at 718 n.15.
424 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-3283(f) (West Supp. 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.113(1) (West 2013); HAw. REV. STAT. § 327E-13(e) (2013); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-
227(5) (Lexis Nexis 2013); Cohen, 760 N.E.2d at 719 n.17.
425 See, e.g., Cohen, 760 N.E.2d at 723.
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directive.426 Several states do not empower a principal to convey authority, even
expressly, to an agent to consent to the principal's ECT; a court order is
required.427 Kentucky empowers patients to issue binding refusals of treatments
but, arguably, does not empower patients to issue binding consents.428 This is
because Kentucky explicitly authorizes patients to use directives to refuse
specific medications or ECT but only to state preferences for medications or
emergency interventions. 4 29 This language suggests doctors are bound to adhere
to the patient's refusals and must consider patient medication preferences but are
not required to administer those medications. 4 3 0 Finally, some states empower a
principal to use a directive to consent to and convey authority to an agent to
consent to intrusive treatments, including ECT43 1 and psychotropic medication.4 32
Analysis
Insufficient Protection under the Uniform Act's Proxy Limitations
The Uniform Act limitation of the potential agent and surrogate pool does
not protect patients with mental illness, particularly against health care fraud.
There is evidence that health care fraud is more pervasive in the mental health
sector.433 Therefore, patients with mental illness are more vulnerable than other
patients to receiving treatment they do not need or to which they have not
consented. A person who has a financial incentive in administering treatment
426 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4652 (West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.540 (2013); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.152 (West 2013); WASH. REv. STAT. § 11.92.043 (2013)
(prohibiting a guardian from consenting to surgery solely for the purpose of psychosurgery).
427 See Jorgensen, supra note 381, at 1 (stating that many states require proxies to obtain prior
court authorization before consenting to ECT on behalf of an incapacitated ward); see, e.g., CAL.
PROB. CODE § 4652 (West 2013); DC STAT. § 7-1231.07(e) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. § 464-A:25
(2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.540 (2013); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.152(f) (2013).
428 See KY. REV. STAT. § 202A.422 (West 2013); Sheetz, supra note 9, at 425.
429 Ky. REv. STAT. § 202A.422 (West 2013).
430 Id.
431 ECT is more regulated than psychotropic medication. See Jorgensen, supra note 381, at
app. A (providing a table of state statutes concerning ECT); see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAw § 330.1717
(2013) (prohibiting administration of ECT without consent from the patient, the guardian, or the
agent if the directive grants the agent authority to consent to ECT); WASH. REV. STAT.
§§ 71.32.260, 71.32.160 (2013) (allowing the principal to indicate whether she consents and
authorizes her agent to consent to administration of ECT).
432 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-36-1.7-3 (2013) (authorizing a patient to specify in a directive
psychotropic medication, electroconvulsive therapy, and inpatient treatment); MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.03(6)(d) (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 122C-73 (West 2013) (allowing use of a directive
to grant or withhold authority for psychotropic medication, electroconvulsive therapy, and inpatient
mental health treatment); WASH. REV. STAT. §§ 71.32.100, 71.32.050, 71.32.260 (2013)
(authorizing a patient to make a declaration consenting to or refusing intrusive mental health
treatments and to convey authority to a proxy to make decisions about intrusive mental health
treatments).
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should not serve as the patient's agent, unless she is a family member. The
Commissioners recognized that patients in nursing homes are particularly
vulnerable and therefore prohibited people affiliated with the patient's nursing
home from being the patient's surrogate or agent.434 However, this should not be
the only limitation on the potential surrogate pool because most patients receive
mental health care outside of long-term residential health care institutions. Unless
the person is related to the principal, no owner, operator, employee, or agent of
any facility where the principal receives care should act as an agent or surrogate.
Too Much Authority to Automatically Selected Surrogates
Although the Uniform Act's definition of health care decisions appears broad
enough to encompass ECT, psychotropic medication, or even psychosurgery, the
Uniform Act and its commentary never specifically address any of these intrusive
treatments.435 This vacuum of guidance combined with the Uniform Act's broad
grant of authority to surrogates the principal never chose 43 6 poses undue risks of
coercion and undue influence.
The following story illustrates how the Uniform Act's lack of guidance on
mental health treatments combined with broad authority to automatically selected
surrogates poses undue risks. In the past, Ms. Jones alleged that Mr. Jones abused
her. She voluntarily admits herself in the psychiatric ward because she is severely
depressed. After admission her psychiatrist determines that she has lost capacity.
She has no guardian, agent, or directive. In the past, Ms. Jones has taken
medication to treat her mental illness. She has never expressed any opinion about
ECT. Mr. Jones notifies her psychiatrist that he will serve as her surrogate. The
psychiatrist explains treatment options to Mr. Jones which include outpatient
ECT. Mr. Jones selects ECT to treat his wife. Her siblings and parents disagree.
Although they have never discussed ECT with Ms. Jones, they believe she would
not want to receive it. They also do not trust Mr. Jones. Nonetheless, Mr. Jones
authorizes ECT.
Unless administering ECT violates the doctor's conscience, is an ineffective
treatment, or contrary to accepted standards (triggering the Uniform Act override
provision), the doctor must comply with the patient's decision and administer
ECT.437 Most likely, none of these narrow exemptions apply to ECT, which,
despite its side effects, is recognized as an effective treatment. Even if the doctor
refuses to administer ECT under the override provision, the doctor must make
reasonable efforts to transfer Ms. Jones to a facility willing to administer ECT.4 38
The Uniform Act requirement for Ms. Jones's express written authorization to
434 Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1243-44.
435 UHCDA § 1(6).
436 Id. § 5(a).
437 Id. § 7(d)-(f).
438 Id. § 7(g).
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enable a proxy to consent to her inpatient mental health treatment does not limit
Mr. Jones's power to consent to his wife's outpatient ECT.439
Although Mr. Jones must have express authority to consent to his wife's
inpatient mental health treatment, the Commissioners failed to impose such a
requirement on outpatient psychotropic medication, ECT, or psychosurgery.440
Because Ms. Jones left no instructions, Mr. Jones is supposed to make her health
care decisions based on his estimation of what is in her best interests.44 Based on
their history, it is quite possible that he would not make decisions in her best
interests. Invoking one of the few Uniform Act safeguards, one of Ms. Jones's
family members may petition the court for an injunction to stop administration of
ECT.442 However, if no family member cares enough to do so or if the family
member does not prevail, Mr. Jones's decision controls the course of treatment.
The history of domestic violence does not limit his power to make health care
decisions for Ms. Jones because the Commissioners neglected to remove from
the surrogate pool family members who might depart from patient values.44 3
Neither Ms. Jones nor a court evaluated whether Mr. Jones could be trusted to
make decisions in line with his wife's values. Most likely, Ms. Jones would not
have chosen Mr. Jones.
It is appropriate for the Uniform Act to create a decision-making framework
444for the vast majority of the population who fails to plan for end-of-life care.
Turning to family makes sense." However, one size does not fit all. In the
mental health context, arbitrarily selecting the spouse to be surrogate because he
is first in line undermines patient autonomy. The Uniform Act's grant of
unchecked authority to a single family member whom the patient never chose
ignores the realities of mental illness which often devastates familial
446relationships, especially marriages. Even in the absence of domestic abuse,
many patients would not want their spouses, acting alone without court approval,
to have the power to authorize ECT, psychotropic medication, or psychosurgery.
The Uniform Act's failure to remove from the surrogate pool individuals who
might depart from patient values undermines patient autonomy and risks coercion
and undue influence.
Look To Patient's Grant of Authority
When a surrogate is automatically selected, the patient has no input.
439 Id. § 13(e) & cmt.
440 Id. § 13(e).
441 Id. § 5(tD.
442 Id. § 14.
443 Stith, supra note 2, at 57-58.
444 See Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1248-49.
445 FURROW, supra note 100, at 849.
446 Davoli, supra note 10, at 1045 (recommending early intervention before a mental illness
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Providing broad authority to an agent the patient selected is less problematic. The
patient maintains influence over her care." 7 When the patient has capacity, she
can communicate her preferences to her agent. She can select an agent she trusts
to make decisions consistent with her values. However, the Uniform Act does not
authorize an agent to consent to the principal's inpatient mental health treatment
based on the principal's grant of unlimited health care decision-making authority
to the agent.448 The Act prohibits an agent from consenting to the principal's
admission to a mental health care institution unless the principal's written
directive expressly provides such authority.449 Cohen v. Bolduc underscores the
reasons why this arbitrary limitation undermines patient autonomy.4 5 0
In Cohen v. Bolduc, the Massachusetts Supreme Court analyzed whether
Massachusetts' general health care proxy statute authorized an agent to commit a
principal to a mental health facility when the principal did not oppose.4 5 1 The
principal's health care proxy stated:
My Health Care Agent is granted full power and authority to consent
to any and all medical treatment which I may need in the event that I am
unable to consent .. . including without limitation authority to consent to
medical care, hospitalization, nursing home admission, or whatever else
may in my Health Care Agent's sole judgment be in my best interest. . . .
I further state ... that there are no limitations imposed upon my Health
Care Agent's authority.452
The proxy was activated when Bolduc's psychiatrist decided Bolduc lacked
capacity. 4 53 Bolduc's psychiatrist admitted Bolduc into a mental health facility
under Massachusetts's emergency psychiatric hospitalization procedures.
Bolduc's agent then converted Bolduc's admission status to conditional
voluntary, a status which imposed no temporal limits on Bolduc's hospitalization.
Had her agent not done so, Massachusetts law would have required the hospital
to file a petition to retain Bolduc involuntarily which would have required proof
that Bolduc met strict involuntary commitment criteria. Later, Bolduc revoked
her proxy and demanded discharge from the hospital.454
The Massachusetts statute did not address whether the principal's grant of
unlimited decision-making authority conveyed to the agent the authority to
consent to the principal's inpatient mental health treatment.455 However, the
447 See Winick, supra note 95, at 82-85.
448 UHCDA § 13(e).
449 Id.
450 Cohen v. Bolduc, 760 N.E.2d 714, 720-24 (Mass. 2002).
451 Id. at 715.
452 Id.
453 Id. at 716.
454 Id. at 716-17.
455 Id. at 718.
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proxy statute granted an agent the authority to make any health care decisions for
the principal and defined "health care" broadly to include treatment of "mental
conditions."456 Cohen concluded that the statutory language suggested that agents
had the authority to commit the principal to a mental health facility.45 7
Cohen also considered the policy implications and wisely determined that
prohibiting an agent from committing her principal frustrated the purpose of the
proxy statute to support patient autonomy. 45 8 Under the statute, the agent's
decisions had the same effect as the principal's decisions. Cohen correctly stated
that restricting the range of advance planning choices unduly limited the
principal's ability to control her own care. The Cohen court departed from the
Uniform Act by not requiring express authority in a written directive to empower
the agent to commit the principal. 4 59 The principal's grant of unlimited authority
to make health care decisions was deemed sufficient.
For a directive to be an effective tool, a patient must be able to use the
directive to consent to mental health treatments and empower an agent to do the
same. The Uniform Act's requirement for express authority in a written directive
for an agent to consent to inpatient mental health treatment460 undermines patient
autonomy for the following reasons.
First, arbitrary limitations on an agent's ability to consent to the principal's
treatment will result in principals not receiving care they need and to which they
consented. The Uniform Act requires the principal to appreciate that she must use
"magic" words conveying authority to an agent to consent to her admission in a
mental health institution.46 1 It is illogical that Bolduc's written grant of unlimited
authority to make health care decisions to her daughter would not include the
right to consent to admission in a mental health facility. 4 6 2 However, had the
Massachusetts Supreme Court applied the Uniform Act, this would have been the
illogical result.463 Patients who grant unlimited authority to agents have the right
to expect that doctors and agents will look to the patient's own words to
determine the scope of the agent's authority.
Second, limiting a patient's right to consent, in advance, to inpatient and
pharmacological mental health treatment imposes a unique burden on patients
with mental illness who have been historically stigmatized. States provide
patients the authority to refuse life-sustaining treatment, either through
instructions or through agents. 4 64 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
right of patient autonomy can outweigh the significant state interest in
456 Id. at 720.
457 Id.
458 Id. at 721.
459 Id. at 715.
460 UHCDA § 13(e) & cmt.
461 Id.
462 Cohen, 760 N.E.2d at 715.
463 UHCDA § 13(e) & cmt.
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preservation of life.4 65 No state interest in preserving life is implicated when a
patient grants an agent authority to consent to psychotropic medication and
inpatient mental health treatment. On the other hand, there is a tremendous
patient interest in securing treatment to prevent a crisis.
However, ECT is a unique, invasive treatment.4 66 The Uniform Act fails to
mention ECT and can be construed to authorize a surrogate the patient never
selected to consent to the patient's outpatient ECT.4 67 Moreover, under the
Uniform Act, a patient who conveys broad decision-making authority but never
mentions ECT arguably conveys authority to an agent to authorize the patient's
ECT.46 8 ECT is more invasive and controversial than pharmacological therapy.4 69
It is for this reason that many states prohibit an agent from consenting to ECT
without a court order.47 0 Because ECT is an effective treatment for many patients,
patients should be able to consent to and convey authority to an agent to consent
to the patient's ECT.4 7 Considering the invasive nature of ECT, advance consent
to ECT should have to be expressed.
No Proxy Consent to Psychosurgery
The Uniform Act grants the authority to make all health care decisions for
the principal when the principal lacks capacity to patients' agents, surrogates, and
guardians.472 This authority is unchecked because no court approval is
necessary.473 The Uniform Act's enumerated examples of health care decisions
focus on end-of-life decisions and do not mention psychosurgery.474 On its face,
the broad definition of health care decision appears to include psychosurgery.4 75
Granting a proxy this authority is unwise, which may be why many states
prohibit a proxy from consenting to the principal's psychosurgery.476 Instead,
doctors should use other, less intrusive treatments to restore the patient's
capacity. At this point, when the patient has regained full capacity, the patient
can decide whether to consent to more invasive treatments such as
psychosurgery.
465 See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
466 See supra notes 380-386 and accompanying text.
467 UHCDA § 1(6).
468 Id. §§ 1(6), 2(b).
469 See supra notes 380-386 and accompanying text.
470 See supra note 427 and accompanying text.
471 See supra notes 384 and 386.
472 UHCDA § 1(6).
473 Id. §§ 2(f), 5(g), 6(c).
474 Id. § 1(6)(iii) (listing orders concerning artificial nutrition and hydration).
475 Id. § 1(6)(ii) (including approval and disapproval of surgical procedures).
476 See supra note 426 and accompanying text.
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G. Directive Templates
The Uniform Act provides a model statutory form which allows principals to
designate agents and provide instructions.4 77 Principals may check boxes to
indicate whether they want to prolong life as long as possible. One section of the
form allows the principal to indicate whether she wants artificial nutrition and
hydration withheld and whether she wants to donate her organs.
The Uniform Act template fails to address common mental health issues, but
more importantly, showing this form at the wrong time to already vulnerable
patients could be confusing and unsettling to the patient. One commentator noted
that some hospitals are reluctant to provide patients with templates that ask for
instructions about harvesting organs because it gives the wrong impression at the
wrong time.478 This is especially true for the patient who has recently recovered
from a mental illness episode and wants to plan for a future episode. Having to
address end-of-life issues distracts the patient from the mental illness issues he
faces and could deter him from creating a directive.
There are real benefits to offering a template. First, the process of developing
a template involves consulting with experts. Stakeholders have an opportunity to
resolve potential issues. This process makes it easier for courts to uphold the
directive when problems arise. Moreover, providing a preapproved form
arguably encourages patients to execute directives. It is simpler for a person to
check boxes than it is for the person to craft an individualized health care plan.
However, some scholars argue that the drawbacks of a model form outweigh
the benefits.479 One scholar observed that "statutory forms tend to become fixed
realities with a life of their own that is resistant to change."4 8 0 Patients with
bipolar disorder, depression, schizophrenia, drug addiction, or various other
mental illnesses481 may elect to create mental health directives. Even patients
diagnosed with one mental illness, such as bipolar disorder, will present in
482different ways and experience different levels of severity of the illness. A
single template cannot address the unique needs of the varied patient population.
Psychiatrists should encourage patients to create their own directives tailored to
their individual needs. There is a danger that a statutory form will become the
483
standard from which patients are afraid to deviate.
477 UHCDA § 4.
478 Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1248.
479 See supra notes 480-483.
480 Sabatino, supra note 2, at 1248.
481 DSM-V, supra note 166, at 87-122 (schizophrenia), 123-88 (mood disorders), 481-590
(substance-related disorders).
482 Id. at 123-54.
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III. SOLUTION: ISSUE A MODEL STATUTE
This Part recommends the Uniform Law Commissioners adopt a model
mental health directive statute, because the Uniform Act, with its focus on end-
of-life, fails people with mental illness. The Uniform Law Commission is the
appropriate organization to issue a model statute because its mission is to
promote uniform state laws in areas where uniformity is desirable and practical.
In the area of advance planning for mental health treatment, patients benefit from
uniformity.
In half of the states that have not enacted mental health directive statutes,
patients must rely on generic directive statutes that fail to address important
mental health issues. Even in the states with specialized statutes, provisions vary
widely and often do not meet the needs of patients with mental illness. 484 A
person's ability to control her illness should not depend on the state in which she
resides. Moreover, patients frequently receive care for acute episodes away from
their hometowns. Uniform direction from the Commissioners helps ensure that a
patient's directive is valid wherever she receives care.
The model provisions in Appendix A improve on the Uniform Act and the
Washington statute. The model provisions fall into the following categories:
(A) Provisions making mental health directives, particularly Ulysses
arrangements, effective intervention tools;
(B) Provisions ensuring mental health directives, particularly Ulysses
arrangements, are created free from undue influence, coercion, or fraud;
(C) Safeguards ensuring mental health directives, particularly Ulysses
arrangements, are properly implemented and not abused; and
(D) Provisions removing obstacles to advance planning.
A. Provisions Making Directives Effective Intervention Tools
Several of the model provisions are designed to empower patients to use their
directives to control their illnesses. The model activation provision provides
guidance the Uniform Act fails to give on how patient designated activation
works in the mental health context. Many state mental health directive statutes do
not allow patients to determine the standard by which their directives become
active. Postponing activation until the point at which a physician determines the
patient has lost capacity delays care. The model language allows patients to
designate when their directives become active and facilitates early intervention.
The Uniform Act imposes the arbitrary requirement for express authority in a
written directive for an agent to authorize the principal's inpatient mental health
treatment. This burden could deprive people of care they need and to which they
consented. Under the model provisions, the plain language of the principal's
written grant of authority determines the scope of the agent's authority to consent
484 See supra Part II.
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to the principal's inpatient mental health treatment and psychotropic medication.
This meets the expectations of a principal who grants unlimited authority to an
agent to make her health care decisions.
The Uniform Act fails to address ECT. Some states prohibit an agent from
consenting to the principal's ECT. Because ECT is recognized as an effective
treatment, the model provisions empower patients to use directives to consent to
ECT and to grant authority to agents to do the same.
The model language enables a patient to form a Ulysses arrangement. First,
the model legislative findings recognize that issues implicated in end-of-life care
differ from issues confronting patients with mental illness and recognizes the
value of Ulysses arrangements. The Uniform Act and even the Washington
statute prevent people from forming truly self-binding arrangements for care.4 85
The model provision empowers patients to receive three weeks of inpatient
mental health care pursuant to their irrevocable directives despite illness-induced
refusals.
The model language better enables patients to control their illnesses than the
Washington statute does in two ways. First, the model language eliminates the
Washington statutory requirement for discharge of an incapacitated patient who
demands discharge, even if discharge contravenes her irrevocable directive.4 86
Second, unlike the Washington statute,4 8 7 the model language creates a rebuttable
presumption of incapacity when a patient's irrevocable directive consents to
treatment that the patient then refuses under the influence of an episode. This
rebuttable presumption recognizes that episodes often cause patients to refuse
treatment. Concerned about liability for unlawfully involuntarily treating a
patient, doctors will likely adjudge patients as having capacity when episodes
cause patients to refuse treatment requested in their directives.48 8 This caution
harms the patient because it prevents intervention. The rebuttable presumption
encourages doctors to follow the directive, despite the patient's illness-induced
objections.
B. Provisions Ensuring Directives are Created Free from Undue Influence,
Coercion, or Fraud
Provisions Applicable to all Mental Health Directives
The Uniform Act's elimination of the requirement for a signed, witnessed
writing489 removes protections for patients who are vulnerable to undue
influence, coercion, and fraud. The model execution provision contains
485 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.32.140(6)(b) (2013).
486 Id.
487 See supra Section II.B.
488 Id.
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safeguards the Uniform Act eliminates such as the requirement of a signed
writing witnessed by two disinterested people who attest that the principal
presented identification and did not appear coerced.
Provisions Applicable Only to Ulysses Arrangements
Recognizing the sensitivities of administering treatment despite illness-
induced refusals, the model provisions create safeguards to ensure Ulysses
arrangements are formed voluntarily by patients with capacity. First, the model
provisions give every patient the right to choose whether their directives will be
revocable when they lack capacity. No patient should have as her only advance
planning option an irrevocable directive. Unlike most state mental health
directive statutes, which require capacity to revoke,490 the model language allows
patients to revoke their directives even when they lack capacity unless they
designate otherwise.
Patients who enter Ulysses arrangements must obtain a clinician attestation
of patient capacity. Moreover, Ulysses arrangements automatically expire two
years after formation unless the patient reaffirms. Automatic expiration helps
address concerns about the risks of unintended consequences due to a patient's
change of heart or failure to foresee all contingencies. Physicians and patients
must engage in ongoing dialogue to ensure the directive remains consistent with
the patient's wishes. Automatic expiration also addresses concerns that consent
provided in a Ulysses arrangement is not contemporaneous informed consent.
Admittedly consent provided through the arrangement is not truly
contemporaneous, but automatic expiration ensures that consent is relatively
recent.
C. Safeguards Ensuring Directives are Properly Implemented and Not Abused
Safeguards Applicable to all Mental Health Directives
Unlike the Uniform Act, which only excludes from the agent/surrogate pool
people affiliated with long-term residential facilities,491 the model language
focuses on mental health. Many people receive mental health treatment outside
nursing homes. To protect against fraud, which is more common in the mental
health sector,492 the model language removes from the potential agent pool
people affiliated with any facility treating the patient.
The model activation provision protects against coercion by clarifying that a
directive does not prevail over contemporaneous preferences of a principal with
capacity. The model language also prohibits a directive from authorizing
57
490 See VHA Report, supra note 10, at 9.
491 UHCDA §§ 2(b), 5(i).
492 See Bucy, supra note 326.
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psychosurgery, a controversial and rarely used treatment.49 3 The Uniform Act's
lack of guidance on intrusive mental health treatments combined with broad
authority granted to surrogates the principal never selected 49 4 poses undue risks
of coercion. In the model statute, the Commissioners should eliminate provisions
for automatic surrogate selection. People whom neither the principal nor a court
selected should not have the power to authorize intrusive mental health
treatments.
Because ECT is more controversial and invasive than pharmacological
therapy, the model language protects patients by forbidding an agent from
consenting to the principal's ECT unless the principal's directive expressly grants
such authority.
Safeguards Applicable to Ulysses Arrangements
The model language sets forth safeguards that address concerns that Ulysses
arrangements violate due process because they enable clinicians to forcibly
hospitalize and treat a patient even when the patient does not meet commitment
criteria. First, doctors must heed treatment refusals from patients with capacity.
Second, the model language requires express consent before administering
psychotropic medication in contravention of illness-induced objections.
Moreover, only licensed psychiatrists may administer the medication and only if
two psychiatrists recommend in writing the specific medication. Third, the
provisions limit self-binding hospitalization to three weeks. Fourth, although
patients may consent in a revocable directive to ECT and authorize an agent to do
so, the provisions do not allow Ulysses arrangements for ECT. This is because
administering ECT, an invasive treatment, in contravention of contemporaneous
objections, creates undue opportunities for coercion. Instead, the patient can use
the Ulysses arrangement to obtain intervention, through other means, such as
drug therapy. Then, when the patient regains capacity, she can consent to ECT if
she so chooses. Fifth, the model language allows patients to seek injunctive
relief All of these safeguards help address concerns that Ulysses arrangements
create opportunities for undue influence, abuse, and coercion from doctors and
family desperate to conquer the patient's illness.
D. Provisions Removing Obstacles to Advance Planning
Some states create obstacles to directive formation that further stigmatize
mental illness, such as requiring a capacity determination to create any mental
health directive. 4 95 The model language creates no unnecessary obstacles to
493 See supra Section I.F.
494 UHCDA § 5(a).
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directive formation. Patients need only obtain a capacity determination if they
form a Ulysses arrangement.
The Uniform Act contains a template that addresses end-of-life issues and
could be confusing and upsetting to otherwise healthy patients with mental
illness. This inappropriate template could deter patients from forming a mental
health directive. Instead of a template,4 96 the Commissioners should provide a
range of samples of directives tailored to the needs of patients with different
mental health planning needs. Samples would assist the patient create a directive
tailored to her own needs. Multiple samples would avoid creating the impression
that deviation from a mandatory form could render the directive unenforceable.
CONCLUSION
Ulysses arrangements enable people to obtain intervention when an acute
mental illness episode prevents them from recognizing they need treatment. The
Uniform Act purports to be a comprehensive model advance directive statute,
which addresses all types of advance health care planning,4 9 7 but it fails to meet
the needs of people with mental illness, most notably by failing to empower
patients to form Ulysses arrangements. Washington's approach is touted as being
at the forefront of patient empowerment. 4 98 However, even Washington prohibits
Ulysses arrangements by requiring discharge of an incapacitated patient who
demands discharge even when releasing the patient contravenes her irrevocable
directive. 499
The Uniform Law Commissioners should issue a model statute that
empowers patients to enter Ulysses arrangements, removes roadblocks to
directive formation, creates parity for mental health care, and prevents fraud,
coercion, and undue influence. The recommended provisions accomplish these
goals. Unlike Washington, the model language does not require doctors to heed a
patient's illness-induced discharge demands, which are in contravention of her
directive.50 0 Further, the model language creates a rebuttable presumption of
incapacity in the event that a patient's irrevocable directive consents to treatment
that the patient then refuses under the influence of an episode.50 ' This
presumption facilitates treatment because it recognizes doctors will be reluctant
to treat a patient in the face of illness-induced refusals. If the Commissioners
adopt this model statute and states follow suit, people with mental illness will
have more power to control their own treatment.
496 UHCDA § 4.
497 See UHCDA § 3.
498 See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.32.140 (2013); Sheetz, supra note 9, at 401, 433.
499 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.32.140(6)(b) (2013).
500 Id. § 71.32.140(6)(b).
501 Id. § 71.32.140(2)(a).
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APPENDIX A: MODEL STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING MENTAL HEALTH
DIRECTIVES
Legislative Findings502
(1) Issues implicated in advance planning for end-of-life care are distinct
from issues implicated in advance planning for mental health care.
(2) An individual with capacity has the right to control decisions relating to
her mental health care.
(3) Mental illness is often episodic. Periods of incapacity obstruct the
individual's ability to give informed consent and impede the individual's access
to mental health care.
(4) Facilitating advance planning helps: (a) prevent unnecessary involuntary
commitment and incarceration, (b) improve patient safety and health, and (c)
improve care and enable patients to exercise control over their treatment.
(5) An acute episode can induce an individual to refuse treatment when the
individual would consent to treatment if the individual's judgment were
unimpaired. Empowering people to create self-binding mental health advance
directives ("directives') to overcome their illness-induced treatment refusals
protects patient safety, autonomy, and health.
(6) Individuals with mental illness have the same rights to plan in advance
for treatment as individuals planning for end-of-life care. A directive can only
accomplish the goals listed above if a patient may use a directive to:
(a) Set forth instructions for mental health care, including consent to
inpatient mental health treatment, psychotropic medication, or electroconvulsive
therapy;
(b) Dictate whether the directive is revocable during periods of incapacity
and consent to treatment despite illness-induced refusals;
(c) Choose the standard by which the directive becomes active; and
(d) Designate an agent to make health care decisions for the patient.
Execution of Directives503
A directive shall:
(1) Be in writing;
(2) Be dated and signed by the principal or the principal's designated
representative if the principal is unable to sign;
(3) State whether the principal wishes to be able to revoke the directive at
502 See id. § 71.32.010 (2013). The Washington statute inspired these model findings, which
emphasize Ulysses arrangements even more than Washington does.
503 These provisions were inspired by WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 71.32.050, 71.32.060, 71.32.090
(2013). Unlike Washington, however, this provision requires a mental health professional
attestation of principal capacity to form a Ulysses arrangement and allows principals who fail to
address revocation to freely revoke. See id. § 71.32.070.
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any time or whether the directive remains irrevocable during periods of
incapacity. Failure to clarify whether the directive is revocable does not render it
unenforceable. If the directive fails to state whether it is revocable, the principal
may revoke it at any time.
(4) Contain a principal affirmation that the principal is aware of the nature
of the document signed and signed the directive freely and voluntarily;5 04
(5) Be witnessed in writing by at least two adults. No witness may be:
(a) A member of the principal 's treatment team;
(b) Related to the principal by blood, adoption, or marriage;
(c) Be in a romantic or dating relationship with the principal;
(d) The agent of the principal or a person designated to make health care
decisions for the principal; or
(e) The owner, operator, employee, or relative of an owner or operator of a
treatment facility in which the principal is a patient.
(6) Witnesses shall attest:
(a) They were present when the principal signed the directive;
(b) The principal did not appear incapacitated or under undue influence or
duress when the principal signed the directive; and
(c) The principal presented identification or the witness personally knows the
principal.
(7) Contain a written, signed attestation from a mental health professional
that the principal had capacity at the time of directive execution, but only if the
principal makes the directive irrevocable. If the principal is free to revoke the
directive at any time, no mental health professional attestation of principal
capacity is required
(8) Be valid upon execution.
Activation ofDirectives
(1) Activation is the point at which the directive is used as the basis of
decision making and dictates treatment of the principal.505
(2) Unless the principal otherwise designates in the directive, a directive
becomes active when the principal loses capacity.
(3) The principal may designate an activation standard other than incapacity
by describing the circumstances under which the directive becomes active.
(4) Despite activation, a directive does not prevail over contemporaneous
preferences expressed by a principal who has capacity.
Role ofAgents506
504 See Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27, 32 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 3456 (2002) (which inspired this provision)).
505 VHA Report, supra note 10, at 8.
506 See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.32.100, which inspired this provision. However, this model
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(1) In a directive, a principal may appoint an agent to make all health care
decisions for the principal, including decisions to consent on behalf of the
principal to electroconvulsive therapy, inpatient mental health treatment, and
psychotropic medication.
(2) Express authorization to the agent to consent to the principal's inpatient
mental health treatment and/or psychotropic medication is not required to
convey authority to an agent to consent to such treatments. Rather, the agent may
consent to such treatments for the principal if the principal's written grant of
authority is sufficiently broad to encompass these decisions. However, an agent
only has the authority to consent to electroconvulsive therapy for the principal if
the principal expressly granted authority to consent to the principal's
electroconvulsive therapy.
(3) An agent's decisions for the principal must be in good faith and
consistent with the principal's instructions expressed in the principal's directive.
If the directive fails to address an issue, the agent shall make decisions in
accordance with the principal's instructions or preferences otherwise known to
the agent. If the agent does not know the principal's instructions or preferences,
the agent shall make decisions in the best interests of the principal.
(4) If the principal grants the agent authority to make decisions for the
principal in circumstances in which the principal still has capacity, the
principal's decisions when the principal has capacity override the agent's
decisions.
(5) Except as otherwise prohibited by law, an agent has the same right as the
principal to receive, review, and authorize the use and disclosure of the
principal's health care information as is necessary for the agent to carry out the
agent's duties for the principal.
(6) Health care decisions an agent makes for a principal are effective
without judicial approval.
(7) When an incapacitated principal refuses inpatient mental health
treatment and/or psychotropic medication, the principal's agent only has the
authority to consent to such treatments for the principal if the principal's
irrevocable directive expressly authorizes the agent to consent to the applicable
treatment.
(8) A principal may not designate as her agent an owner, operator, or
employee of a facility at which the principal is receiving care or a relative of
such owner or operator unless the designated person is related to the principal
by blood, marriage, or adoption.
Permissible Scope ofDirectives
In directives, principals may issue instructions or appoint agents to make
decisions concerning all aspects of their mental-health treatment, except as
limited by subsection (4) below, including:
(1) Consent to or refusal of specific types of mental health treatments,
including psychotropic medication, electroconvulsive therapy, and inpatient
63
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mental health treatment; Consents to electroconvulsive therapy must be express;
(2) Preferences concerning treatment facilities and care providers;
(3) Nomination of a guardian for the court to consider if guardianship
proceedings commence; but
(4) Principals may not consent to or authorize agents to consent to
psychosurgery in a directive.
Revocation of Directives; Procedures for Implementing Self-Binding
Arrangements, and Automatic Expiration only ofSelf-Binding Arrangements 507
(1) Except self-binding arrangements as described in (5) below, directives
remain in effect until they expire under their own terms or are revoked by the
principal. Self-binding arrangements automatically expire two years after they
are executed unless the principal reaffirms the arrangement. In the event the
principal is incapacitated at the end of the two-year time frame, the self-binding
arrangement remains in effect until the principal regains capacity and
determines whether to reaffirm the arrangement.
(2) A principal may freely revoke a directive even if she is incapacitated
unless the principal makes her directive irrevocable during periods of incapacity.
To be irrevocable, the directive shall:
(a) State that the directive remains irrevocable during periods of incapacity;
and
(b) Contain an attestation from a mental health professional that the
principal had capacity at the time of executing the directive.
(3) A principal with capacity or a principal without capacity who did not
make her directive irrevocable during periods of incapacity may revoke a
directive by:
(a) A written statement revoking the directive;
(b)A subsequent directive that revokes the original directive. If the
subsequent directive does not revoke the original directive in its entirety, only
inconsistent provisions in the original directive are revoked; or
(c) Physical destruction of the directive with the intent that it be revoked
(4) When a principal with capacity consents to treatment that is different
than the treatment requested in her directive or refuses treatment that the
principal requested in her directive, this consent or refusal does not revoke the
entire directive but is a waiver of the inconsistent provision.
(5) A principal has a right to form a self-binding arrangement for care. Self-
binding arrangements allow the principal to obtain treatment in the event that an
acute episode renders the principal incapacitated and induces the principal to
refuse treatment. To provide advance consent to inpatient treatment despite the
principal's illness-induced refusals, in her directive, a principal shall:
(a) Make her directive irrevocable pursuant to subsection (2) above; and
(b) Consent to admission in an inpatient treatment facility.
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(c) If the principal wants administration of psychotropic medication despite
the principal's illness-induced refusals of medication, the principal shall
expressly consent to psychotropic medication in the irrevocable directive.
(6) If the principal forms a self-binding arrangement for treatment but then
refuses admission despite the directive's instructions to admit, the facility shall
respond as follows:
(a) The facility shall, as soon as practicable, obtain the informed consent of
the principal's agent, ifany is designated.
(b) Two mental health professionals shall within 24 hours of the principal's
arrival at the facility evaluate the principal to determine whether the principal
has capacity and to document in the principal's medical record a summary of
findings, evaluations, and recommendations.
(c) The principal's statements in her directive requesting inpatient treatment
upon activation of the directive, combined with activation of the directive, and
contemporaneous refusals of treatment requested in the directive create a
rebuttable presumption that the principal lacks capacity.
(d) If the evaluating mental health professionals determine the principal
lacks capacity, the principal shall be admitted into the treatment facility pursuant
to the principal's directive. The treating mental health professional shall
document in the principal's medical records all treatment administered. After 21
days from the date of admission, if the principal has not regained capacity or has
regained capacity but refuses to consent to remain for additional treatment, the
facility shall release the principal during daylight hours unless the principal is
detained pursuant to involuntary commitment standards.
(7) If a principal who has been determined to lack capacity continues to
refuse inpatient treatment, the principal may immediately seek injunctive relief
for release from the facility.
(8) If a principal with an irrevocable directive consenting to inpatient
treatment refuses psychotropic medication through words or actions, only a
licensed psychiatrist may administer psychotropic medication, and only if:
(a) The principal expressly consented to psychotropic medication in the
principal's irrevocable directive;
(b) The agent, if one was designated, consented to psychotropic medication;
and
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